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Information Matters in Tax Enforcement
Leandra Lederman* & Joseph C. Dugan**
Most scholars recognize both that the government needs information
about taxpayers’ transactions to determine whether their reporting is
honest, and that third-party reporting helps the government obtain that
information. Given governments’ reliance on tax collections, it would be
risky to think that information or third-party reporting is not needed by
tax agencies. However, a recent article by Professor Wei Cui asserts that
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without information.’”
Professor Cui’s argument rests on two claims: (1) “giving governments
effective access to taxpayer information through third parties does not
explain the success of modern tax administration” because, he argues,
some important taxes—such as the value added tax (VAT)—do not
involve information reporting; and (2) modern tax administration
succeeds because “business firms” are “sites of social cooperation under
the rule of law,” fostering compliance. Both arguments are mistaken. As
this Article demonstrates, third-party information reporting is highly
effective, third-party reporting is used to enforce VATs, and firms are not
inherently compliant. In fact, where individuals report on firms, firms’
compliance increases. This supports the intuitive notion that third-party
reporting increases tax compliance and that information matters in
tax enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Economists and legal experts have long recognized that the
government needs information about taxpayers’ transactions
in order to determine whether their reporting is honest. Tax experts
have likewise long recognized that third-party information
reporting (TPIR) is an important tool to promote compliance
with the tax law.1 For example, in its most recent study of
1. See, e.g., Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from
a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 653 (2011) (“[O]ur findings
suggest that tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they
are unable to cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Mark
D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data
Show?, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 531, 563 (2014) (“Using U.S. taxpayer-level data . . . this paper has
shown that the presence and amount of unmatched income are the primary determinants of
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tax compliance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported
the following voluntary (unenforced) compliance rates
for individuals:2
Type of Income
“Income subject to
substantial information
reporting and
withholding”
“Income subject to
substantial information
reporting”
“Income subject to some
information reporting”
“Income subject to little or
no information reporting”

Voluntary Compliance
Rate
99%

95%
83%
45%

These statistics reveal several important comparisons:
• Substantially complete information reporting by
a third party results in almost as much voluntary

income tax noncompliance.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion,
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation
between the rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as
information reports and employer withholding.”).
2. See IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS
2011–2013, at 14 fig.3 (2019) [hereinafter TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013]
(emphasis added), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf (showing noncompliance
rates). The IRS explains its methodology, as well as the limitations of the methodology,
as follows:
The estimates were prepared by the IRS and are based on original research and
analysis conducted or sponsored by the IRS. Estimating the tax gap is inherently
challenging and requires assessing the merits of alternative methods,
assumptions, and data sources. There is no single approach that can be used for
estimating all the components of the tax gap, so multiple methods are used. Each
approach is subject to non-sampling error; the component estimates that are based
on samples are further subject to sampling error. The uncertainty of the estimates
is not readily captured by standard errors that typically accompany estimates
based on sample data. For that reason, standard errors, confidence intervals, and
significance tests for statistical comparisons across years are not reported. When
using these estimates and making comparisons across years, the user should be
mindful of these limitations.
Id. at 1.
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compliance by the individual taxpayer as
actually having the third party withhold those
taxes and remit them directly to the government.
• The extent of information reporting matters.
When only some information about the payment
is reported—rather than most or all of the
information needed for tax reporting—the
compliance rate decreases (from an estimated 95
percent of the dollars due to an estimated 83
percent).
• Individuals have a much lower (45 percent)
estimated compliance rate with respect to
receipts not subject to information reporting,
such as cash received from a small business.
These reductions in estimated tax compliance as third-party
reporting decreases are consistent over time in IRS studies.3
Accordingly, the IRS has stated that “[t]he estimates confirm the
relationship between reporting compliance and third-party
information reporting that was demonstrated in earlier tax gap
estimates. For the individual income tax, reporting compliance is
far higher when income items are subject to information reporting
and even higher when also subject to withholding.”4
The logic underlying TPIR relies on a fairly straightforward,
two-part insight. First, asymmetric information is a core problem
for modern tax laws because the taxpayer knows the relevant
facts—such as the details of the transactions that he or she
engaged in—while the government does not.5 Second, adding a
third party (generally a payor or recordkeeper) to the taxpayergovernment taxpaying relationship fosters taxpayer compliance

3. See, e.g., id. at 14 fig.3; IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 12 fig.1 (2016) [hereinafter TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR
TAX YEARS 2008–2010], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415.pdf (showing estimated
noncompliance rates for the categories in the chart that translate to voluntary compliance
rates of 99%, 93%, 81%, and 37%); IRS, TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 3 fig.1 (2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf (reflecting compliance
rates of 99%, 92%, 89%, and 44%); IRS, TAX YEAR 2001 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
UNDERREPORTING GAP 2 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_update_
070212.pdf (reflecting compliance rates of 98.8%, 95.5%, 91.4%, and 46.1%).
4. TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3, at 11.
5. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010).
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because the taxpayer no longer acts unobserved. Arm’s-length
parties with a reporting obligation could collude with the taxpayer
to underreport, but collusion is riskier than cheating alone, and
thus less likely. In addition, reporting parties have several
incentives to comply with their obligations, including the difficulty
of accomplishing collusion on a large scale and the risk of detection
and resulting sanctions.
Yet a 2018 article by Professor Wei Cui, titled Taxation Without
Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax Collection,
questions the significance of information reporting, asserting that
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without
information.’”6 Cui’s article argues that (1) “giving governments
effective access to taxpayer information through third parties does
not explain the success of modern tax administration”;7 and (2)
instead, what explains this success is that “business firms”8 are
“sites of social cooperation under the rule of law,”9 fostering
compliance. Cui’s article has attracted some attention, with
Professor Daniel Hemel stating in an online review that he believes
Cui is “largely right.”10
While Cui’s contrarian thesis is provocative, this Article shows
that both of its claims are incorrect. With respect to Cui’s first
argument, while the success of modern tax administration systems
may turn on a variety of factors, empirical studies show that
information sharing—and TPIR in particular—are critical features
of an effective tax administration strategy.11 This is not to suggest

6. Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax
Collection, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 93, 146 (2018) (quoting Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Why Can
Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83
ECONOMICA 219, 225 fig.2 (2016)).
7. Id. at 99.
8. Id. at 100. Cui does not define the term “business firm” or “firm” in his article. His
usage seems to encompass all businesses, incorporated and unincorporated. See, e.g., id. at
134 (recognizing that “a ‘firm’ could be a sole business proprietor”). This Article takes the
same approach.
9. Id. at 100.
10. Daniel Hemel, Weekly SSRN Tax Article Review and Roundup, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar.
24, 2017), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/03/weekly-ssrn-tax-articlereview-and-roundup-3.html.
11. See infra Section II.A.1.
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that TPIR is a panacea; Cui is right to recognize that it is not.12 Nor
is it necessarily the first-best solution.13 But, as discussed below, the
existing empirical data generally show TPIR to be highly effective.14
As one of the authors of this Article previously explained, thirdparty reporting is generally structured with firms (which are far
fewer in number) reporting on individuals, both because
centralization is efficient and because firms typically have more
sophisticated accounting infrastructures than individuals do.15 This
typical structure may initially make it difficult to differentiate the
impact of the firm’s participation in a transaction from that of the
information reporting itself. However, empirical studies have
found that information reporting by individuals likewise increases
firms’ tax compliance—a finding that Cui’s contrarian thesis does
not explain.16
Cui’s second argument—that pro-social behavior by firms
explains the success of modern tax administration—is not correct
as a theoretical or empirical matter, as discussed below.17 For one
thing, if firms were inherently pro-social, one would expect even
small firms to have high tax compliance rates, which Cui
acknowledges is not the case.18 Instead, small businesses present a
major enforcement problem.19 Large firms—which are much more
highly regulated and monitored—generally are more compliant

12. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1736 (“Information reporting . . . is certainly not a
panacea. Moreover, it will not be equally effective in all situations.” (footnote omitted)); id.
at 1739–41 (arguing that some proposals for information reporting are unwise, and
developing six factors to consult when evaluating proposals for additional information
reporting in the United States); see also infra note 90 (noting the challenges for TPIR in
countries where the tax administration lacks the capacity to use the information).
13. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section II.A.1; cf. infra text accompanying notes 375–86 (discussing the
success of programs in which individuals report on transactions with firms).
15. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1740 (including bookkeeping infrastructure and
relative centralization of businesses as factors to use when evaluating proposals for
additional information reporting).
16. See infra notes 378–91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Sections III.A–III.C.
18. See Cui, supra note 6, at 105 n.54 (citing Joel Slemrod as “explaining that tax
enforcement for small businesses is more challenging than for large firms”); id. at 134
(mentioning “small firms and firms under intense competitive pressure and the fact that
these firms are more likely to act in disregard of the law than others”); see also infra Section
III.A.3.a.
19. See infra Section III.A.
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but have also committed numerous highly publicized frauds and
other violations.20
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three principal Parts.
Part I sets forth the key contentions in Professor Cui’s article,
including the reasons why he believes TPIR may not adequately
explain the success of modern tax administration and his notion of
the business firm as a pro-social locus of compliance. Part II
challenges Cui’s contentions regarding information reporting, and
it argues that taxation without information as a theoretical concept
is inconsistent with empirical data and well-settled norms of
human behavior. Part III then rebuts Cui’s contention that business
firms are inherently pro-social. Part III also shows that the existing
empirical studies find that firms’ tax reporting increases when they
are monitored by individuals.
The Article concludes that government access to taxpayer
information is a linchpin of effective tax administration; third-party
reporting is a valuable component of such information sharing; and
firms are not inherently honest, but rather, observability is a key
factor in tax administration. Accordingly, information sharing is
central to effective tax enforcement.
I. TAXATION WITHOUT INFORMATION? PROFESSOR CUI’S
CONTRARIAN THEORY
Though modern tax administration systems differ in their
particulars, most include a tax collection authority with civil and
criminal enforcement powers21 and mechanisms for the tax
authority to obtain information about taxpayers’ transactions.22 The

20. See infra Sections III.A.1–A.2.
21. See OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATION IN OECD AND SELECTED NON-OECD COUNTRIES:
COMPARATIVE INFORMATION SERIES (2008), at 10 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/
administration/CIS-2008.pdf (“In virtually all the surveyed countries, the tax system is
responsible for generating the vast bulk of revenue that is required to fund Government
services. . . . [R]evenue bodies need adequate powers and autonomy to perform in an
efficient and effective manner.”); id. at 128 (“While practices vary, a common approach sees
penalties for minor offences in the region of 10–30% of the tax evaded while more serious
offences involving deliberate evasion are in the region of 40–100% of the tax evaded.”).
22. Id. at 121 (“All surveyed revenue bodies have powers to obtain relevant
information and in 41 out of 43 revenue bodies these powers can extend to third parties. The
circumstances in which entry and search powers can be used varies between countries, as
does the use of warrants and the extent of the involvement of other government agencies.”).
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need for information is intuitive: a government cannot effectively
tax income sources that are not on its radar.23
Yet in a startling recent article, Professor Wei Cui argues
that “modern governments . . . [can] practice precisely ‘taxation
without information.’”24
Professor Cui contends that contemporary tax scholarship’s
“emphasis on TPIR is misplaced”25 and that “TPIR cannot play the
explanatory role that social scientists have assigned it.”26 Rejecting
the theory that TPIR facilitates compliance by overcoming an
information asymmetry, Cui ascribes to TPIR a “quite limited” role
in tax administration27 because it is “incapable of explaining tax
compliance by business firms”28 and “no evidence has been
produced that ‘but for’ TPIR, the level of compliance could not be
as high as is actually observed.”29
Cui’s article further argues that “modern governments can
practice ‘taxation without information’”30 because of the role that
business firms play in tax administration: “Compliance with legal
rules and norms, and monitoring the compliance of other parties,
are intrinsic aspects of the modern business firm as an
23. For this reason, countries with large cash-based or “shadow” economies tend to
be countries with high estimated rates of tax evasion. Greece presents a helpful example: one
study found that two out of three Greek workers understates his or her income, with nearly a
quarter of all economic activity undeclared. Greece’s Shadow Economy: The Treasures of
Darkness, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21623742-getting-greeks-pay-more-tax-not-just-hard-risky-treasures.
24. Cui, supra note 6, at 93 (emphasis added). Cui’s argument focuses on both
developed and developing countries. See, e.g., id. at 140 (“Understanding the institutional
foundations of modern taxation has deep policy implications both for developing countries
aiming to enhance their state capacity and for developed countries like the United
States . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Cui’s article is not entirely clear as to whether he is making
a broad claim about all forms of information transmission in tax enforcement, as the
quotation above suggests, or a narrower claim about TPIR only. It also is not obvious that
Cui believes governments can, let alone should, practice taxation without information. E.g.,
id. at 145 (“None of the arguments in this Article are meant to suggest that the U.S. should
roll back any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to deny that TPIR may have
assorted benefits for taxpayers.”). In any event, because TPIR is an important example, but
only one example, of information-sharing mechanisms in tax enforcement, this Article
emphasizes TPIR but also discusses information more broadly.
25. Id. at 93.
26. Id. at 99.
27. Id. at 104.
28. Id. at 127.
29. Id. at 114.
30. Id. at 146.

152

145

Information Matters in Tax Enforcement

institution.”31 According to Cui, it is the pro-social tendencies
among business firms—not information reporting—that explains
the success of tax administration in advanced economies.32
Cui’s argument is provocative, but it does not withstand
scrutiny for three reasons. First, not only does TPIR promote
compliance with the personal income tax,33 but empirical studies
have shown that third-party reporting promotes compliance with
other taxes, such as the value-added tax (VAT).34 Second, in
contexts in which TPIR is not feasible but compliance remains high,
other sources of information-transparency serve a similar function
to TPIR. These reliable information flows include regulatory
reporting requirements to the taxing authority and to other non-tax
agencies imposed on business firms, and Cui’s article does not seem
to address these pressures to comply.35 Third, the available
evidence indicates that business firms are not intrinsically
law-abiding.36 The remainder of this Part summarizes Cui’s
arguments. Parts II and III then respond to and rebut Cui’s
principal contentions.
A.

Cui’s View of the Role of Information and TPIR

Cui begins with an uncontroversial statement: “[b]uilding
effective tax administration is one of the most urgent tasks facing
the poorer countries of the world in their pursuit of sustainable
development.”37 As Cui acknowledges, existing scholarship
emphasizes that developed countries, with comparably successful
tax administration regimes, typically have robust information
reporting and, in particular, TPIR systems.38
Yet, Cui believes the emphasis on TPIR is misplaced. Departing
from the conventional view that taxpayers are more honest when
31. Id. at 138.
32. Id. at 100.
33. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 88–96.
34. See infra notes 379–80.
35. See infra Section III.B.1.
36. See infra Part III.
37. Cui, supra note 6, at 94–95.
38. Id. at 96–97. Examples of TPIR that will be familiar to readers in the United States
include Form W-2 (by which an employer reports on an employee’s wages) and Form 1099.
Form 1099 is used by to report on various types of payments, including a payment to a
contractor (on Form 1099-MISC), a retirement fund beneficiary (Form 1099-R), or an investor
(Forms 1099-DIV and 1099-INT).
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they believe the government has access to their information,39 Cui
questions whether information asymmetry is “the most important
kind of enforceability constraint for taxes.”40 Cui contends that
TPIR is “most pronounced in the individual income tax context,
and only for wage and passive investment income,”41 whereas
“there is no obvious way in which the corporate income tax is
enforced through TPIR,”42 and “TPIR with respect to individual
business income is largely incomplete.”43 In Cui’s view,
“emphasizing TPIR seems to privilege, without obvious
justification, (certain elements of) the individual income tax.”44
Cui contends that the (supposed) lack of third-party reporting
in the context of VATs or corporate income taxes supports his thesis
that TPIR is not central to tax enforcement.45 And Professor Daniel
Hemel agrees, writing that “[Cui] has persuaded me that third
party reporting is not nearly as integral to tax collection as I
previously believed.”46 In part that is because Hemel accepts Cui’s
assertion47 that VATs do not use third-party reporting.48

39. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-652T, OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE THE TAXPAYER EXPERIENCE AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 8 (2007),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590425.pdf (“IRS research shows that when taxpayers
know that IRS is receiving data from third parties, they are more likely to correctly report
the income or expenses to IRS.”); OECD, TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO TACKLE TAX EVASION AND
TAX FRAUD 13 tbl.2.1 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/technology-tools-to-tackletax-evasion-and-tax-fraud.pdf (“Regular data transmission of the records to the tax authority
deters taxpayers from altering records as they know the tax authority will have direct data.”);
Junmin Wan, The Incentive to Declare Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in
China, 14 REV. DEV. ECON. 611, 611–12 (2010) (“[L]ike the other countries in the world,
China’s government suffers the issue of tax evasion because of the asymmetry of
information. For example, to collect the sales tax . . . , the government needs to obtain
financial records of transactions between a firm and a consumer . . . .”).
40. Cui, supra note 6, at 103; see id. at 104.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Id. at 104.
43. Id. at 105.
44. Id. at 106.
45. Id. at 105–06.
46. Hemel, supra note 10.
47. Id. Hemel’s comment in this regard is addressed below. See infra text
accompanying note 139.
48. Cui, supra note 6, at 104 (“Under the VAT . . . , firms generally do not transmit
information about payments to and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the
government, but instead aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax
returns.”). This claim is rebutted below. See infra Section II.B.

154

145

Information Matters in Tax Enforcement

Cui offers three reasons why TPIR may be less important than
the literature suggests. First, Cui argues that information
transmission is illusory in the sense that “for any item of income
such that there is a payor that possesses both complete information
about it and control over its payment, information reporting is only
one among several ways in which the government can collect
tax.”49 That is, both final withholding (where the payor withholds
the precise amount of tax due from payment) and the imposition of
an excise tax on the payor (instead of taxing the payee) are potential
alternatives to TPIR.50
Second, Cui argues that payor compliance with reporting
requirements is a “puzzle.” Why, Cui asks, might third parties
responsible for TPIR choose to comply with the tax law instead of
colluding with the income recipients to evade that law?51 As
discussed below,52 Cui posits that payor firms comply not because
it necessarily makes economic sense for them to do so, nor because
they fear sanctions for noncompliance, but because firms are
inherently law-abiding.53
Finally, Cui argues that it is difficult to assess the importance of
TPIR because it is hard to disentangle TPIR from the nature of the
income itself and the nature of the payor.54 Cui writes that most
financial transactions create some kind of paper trail, and the mere
existence of that trail (apart from any TPIR) might induce
compliance.55 He speculates that the presence of large firms in
developed economies with relatively high tax compliance may
better explain such high compliance than does TPIR.56
B.

Cui’s View of the Role of Business Firms

According to Cui, while scholars have traditionally “[thought]
of business firms as ‘fiscal intermediaries’” that collect and remit
taxes, a better approach may be to view them “as sites of social

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Cui, supra note 6, at 107.
Id.
Id. at 111.
See infra Section I.B.
Cui, supra note 6, at 138–39.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 115. The role of firm size is discussed infra in Section III.C.
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cooperation under the rule of law.”57 This is so, Cui reasons, both
because (1) firms are constrained by a wide array of legal rules and
norms, such that even firms that choose to violate some rules (his
examples are Volkswagen and Wells Fargo58) comply with many
others;59 and (2) the worst of the bad actors that violate many rules
tend to be “small firms and firms [that operate] under intense
competitive pressure.”60 Cui argues that “few firms are organized
with the expectation that [they] would deliberately profit from the
violation of all laws that are profitable to violate, and few firms
grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities.”61
In so reasoning, Cui takes issue with an important article on the
topic of business firms and tax compliance. In 2016, Professors
Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (KKS) described “a three-tiered . . .
model” under which business firms report information to the
government on behalf of individual income earners.62 In theory,
KKS argued, “the firm and its employees could collude to report
smaller incomes . . . to the government than those actually
earned.”63 But “[i]n practice, breakdowns can occur because of
random shocks such as conflicts between employees and the
employer, moral concerns of employees or an employee
accidentally revealing the true business records to tax inspectors.”64
The more employees a firm retains, the likelier these “breakdowns”
become.65 Even in a very large firm (say, a multinational
corporation) with massive resources and thousands of employees,
“a single employee can denounce collusive tax cheating between
employees and the employer by . . . revealing true books to the
government.”66 The KKS model acknowledges that business firms
play a central role in modern tax administration—not because they

57. Cui, supra note 6, at 100.
58. Id. at 131.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 219–20.
63. Id. at 220. Cui agrees with this. See Cui, supra note 6, at 113 (“[W]hen parties are
not subject to the same tax rates . . . the potential will always exist for the parties to collude
and lower the net payment to the government.”).
64. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 241.
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are inherently pro-social but because there is an inverse correlation
between the size of a firm and the feasibility of cheating.
Professor Cui thinks KKS have it backwards. Business firms, he
argues, do not decide to comply with the tax law only when an
internal collusive bargain cannot be sustained; “[i]nstead, firms are
places where members of society actively cooperate under regimes
of law.”67 Cui’s claim in this regard is that, because the
development of the modern business firm and the regulatory state
were intertwined,68 “complying with the tax law, like complying
with other bodies of laws, is the default option” for firms.69
Thus, Cui argues that it is the presence of firms, not TPIR, that
explains the success of modern tax administration. In developing
his argument, Cui raises the trope that the deterrence model of tax
compliance, developed by Professors Allingham and Sandmo,70
does not explain observed compliance levels in developed
countries.71 Under the deterrence model, the taxpayer compares the
cost of compliance with the expected cost of evading.72 The reason
for the trope is that audit and penalty rates may seem to be too low
in advanced economies such as the United States for a rational
taxpayer to comply with the tax laws at all,73 yet the IRS
consistently estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of over
67. Cui, supra note 6, at 140.
68. See id. at 139 (“Because the operation of most business firms was inseparable from
the implementation and following of legal orders, the decision to comply with the tax law
was a natural one for firms to make.”).
69. Id. at 134–35.
70. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,
1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323–26 (1972). The model is based on Gary Becker’s economic model of
crime. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
71. See Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (“It has been widely observed that by itself, this simple
model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems unable to explain the high level of
tax compliance observed at least in developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits,
and evasion detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational individual
considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion.”).
72. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1463 (2003).
73. See J. Manhire, Toward a Perspective-Dependent Theory of Audit Probability for Tax
Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629, 629 (2014) (“The classic deterrence theory model of
income tax evasion first articulated in 1972 has met significant criticism because it does not
comport with the observed rate of tax compliance.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or
Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377
(2002) (“Tax compliance rates—which vary dramatically across nations—seem to bear no
connection to enforcement levels.”).
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eighty percent.74 A key reason the trope is inaccurate, as one of the
authors of this Article explained in prior work, is that it treats audits
as the only detection mechanism, ignoring the fact that information
reporting makes much income transparent to the tax authority.75
“Opportunity [to evade] has often been documented as a major
explanatory factor in non-compliance.”76
Cui raises the trope because he says that “scholars have
suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model can be salvaged
if one considers the role of business firms.”77 Cui states that these
scholars argue as follows:
When firms both automatically provide information to the
government and maintain information relevant to audits, then the
probability of detection of tax evasion (conditional upon an audit
being carried out) is increased. Moreover, when there are fewer
firms than individual taxpayers, the audit rate for firms is
higher than for individuals, which also increases the probability
of detection.78

74. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 8 fig.1
(estimating an 83.6% voluntary compliance rate); id. at 10 fig.2 (reporting slightly revised
estimate of 83.8% for tax years 2008–10, of 82.3% for tax year 2006, and of 83.7% for tax year
2001). Note that the IRS’s voluntary compliance estimates likely are overstated. See TREASURY
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-IE-R008, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NEEDS TO
IMPROVE THE COMPREHENSIVENESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND TIMELINESS OF THE TAX
GAP ESTIMATE 2 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2013reports/
2013IER008fr.pdf (“[T]he individual income tax underreporting gap estimate could be more
comprehensive if it included estimates for the informal economy and offshore tax evasion.”).
75. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 5, at 1738–39 n.18; Leandra Lederman, Statutory
Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–99 (2007)
[hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the
Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974–99 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Reformed IRS];
Lederman, supra note 72, at 1460.
76. Bernadette Kamleitner et al., Tax Compliance of Small Business Owners, 18 INT’L J.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAV. & RES. 330, 335 (2012) (citations omitted) (also noting that where
noncompliance opportunities exist, inadvertent errors may also increase); see also Kleven et
al., supra note 1, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers
are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat successfully due to the widespread
use of third-party reporting.”); TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3,
at 11 (IRS reports that “[f]or the individual income tax, reporting compliance is far higher
when income items are subject to information reporting[.]”).
77. Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (citing Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 241; Wojciech Kopczuk
& Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 130, 133–34 (2006)).
The Kopczuk and Slemrod article does not cite Allingham and Sandmo. Kopczuk & Slemrod,
supra, at 134 (listing references).
78. Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (footnote omitted).
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In other words, the presence of firms that serve as information
reporters increases the likelihood of detection, further deterring
tax noncompliance.79 Cui argues that this insight “merely begs
a further question: why do decision-makers in firms—owners,
managers, and employers—choose not to evade tax? Why do
they provide accurate information about other taxpayers
to the government?”80 The answer, Cui argues, is that firms
are pro-social.81
Professor Daniel Hemel agrees with Cui’s arguments that TPIR
is relatively unimportant to tax compliance and that firms are the
key.82 Where Hemel disagrees with Cui is with respect to Cui’s
“‘social cooperation’ theory” of firms.83 Hemel states that Cui’s
claim “is equally consistent with the claim that business firms
facilitate legal compliance precisely because they fail to engender
close cooperation among their members.”84 That was also a point
made by KKS in the article to which Cui’s article responds.85
79. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 75, at 974–99 (“[The] simple comparison of
relatively high rates of voluntary compliance rates with relatively low audit rates and
penalties is flawed because it does not account for the role of information reporting and
withholding in constraining the opportunity to evade tax.”).
80. Cui, supra note 6, at 129–30. Cui argues in part,
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim deductions for
wage payments, which lower the employer’s income tax liability. The employee
and the employer thus have adverse interests, or opposing incentives, with respect
to reporting wage payments: while the employee stands to lose from employer
reporting, the employer gains from it. Information reporting is therefore “selfenforcing.”
Id. at 111–12. The only footnote with a citation is at the end, accompanying the quoted phrase
“self-enforcing.” Id. The footnote reads, “Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15,
at 1739, 1747, 1751 n.93; Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 15, at 711, 729-30.” Id.
at 112 n.88. However, the first Lederman article cited does not use the phrase “self-enforcing”
(or variations such as “self-enforced”) anywhere in the article. Lederman, supra note 5, at
1733–59. The second article uses the phrase only on page 711, stating, “Audit rates are quite
low, so tax provisions that are effectively self-enforcing are much more administrable than
provisions that are not self-enforcing.” Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at
711 (footnote omitted). The context there is the structural advantage for tax enforcement that
exclusions of reimbursed amounts have over deductions for expenditures. See id.
81. Cui, supra note 6, at 140.
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
83. Hemel, supra note 10.
84. Id.
85. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220 (“When a firm has many employees,
breakdowns of collusion will occur with a high probability. Critically, it is the combination
of a large number of informed employees, and the existence of business records evidence,
which makes third-party tax enforcement successful.”).
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The remainder of this Article demonstrates how the existing
evidence is inconsistent with Cui’s contrarian thesis. The next Part
explains the demonstrable significance of information reporting,
and the final Part rebuts Cui’s argument that business firms are
inherently pro-social.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TO TAX ENFORCEMENT
This Part demonstrates that the scholarly consensus regarding
information is well-founded: (1) there can be no effective taxation
without information, and (2) TPIR is a highly effective means of
obtaining that information in appropriate contexts.
A.

The Effects of Information Transparency

Although tax evasion is a crime, enforcement authorities have
finite, sometimes modest, investigative and prosecutorial
resources,86 making the risk of criminal sanction by itself unlikely
to deter all evasion.87 Likewise, while the IRS (like comparable tax
administrative agencies in other advanced economies) conducts
audits and may impose penalties, the IRS is in a disadvantaged
position vis-à-vis the taxpayer, as the IRS generally knows
only what the taxpayer reports—or what others report about
the taxpayer.
1. Observability
The literature shows that taxpayers are more compliant when
they believe the government can observe their noncompliance. For
example, one study found that cash-based business owners
generally regard credit card receipts as being distinct from cash,
such that they consistently report the former but not always

86. The IRS provides an example. See IRS, BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2017, at 2 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/IRS%20FY%202017%20BIB.pdf (“Over the last
several years, the IRS has experienced significant budget reductions that are creating serious
obstacles to its ability to fulfill its mission.”).
87. In 2018, for example, the IRS initiated 2,886 investigations in total, of which 1,099
were for legal-source tax crimes. It reported 614 incarcerations for legal-source tax crimes.
IRS, 2018 DATA BOOK 44 tbl.18 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf. The
likelihood of detection is very important. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, White-Collar Showdown,
102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 320, 327 (2017) (“Recent data suggest[] . . . that the probability of
getting caught looms larger [than the penalty] in white-collar criminals’ calculus.”).
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the latter.88 This suggests that these individuals regard amounts
with a paper trail as more visible to the government. Similarly, a
study with respect to Chile’s VAT found that an audit threat from
the Chilean tax authority resulted in an immediate increase in VAT
remittances, primarily driven by the transactions for which there is
no paper trail—sales to consumers—suggesting that the presence
of a paper trail between firms in the supply chain deters cheating.89
That study’s author, Dina Pomeranz, referred to the paper trail as
“the self-enforcing mechanism of the VAT.”90
Perhaps the starkest example in U.S. history of the relationship
between information transparency and compliance is when, in the
mid-1980s, Congress began requiring individual taxpayers to
provide the Social Security number of anyone age five or older
whom they claimed as a dependent.91 “Seven million dependents
88. Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 37, 50 (2009). Taxpayer behavior in the credit-card context also makes TPIR less
important there. See infra text accompanying note 116.
89. Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in
the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2540 (2015).
90. Id. at 2541.
A study in Pakistan similarly found “that VAT is indeed self-enforcing.” Mazhar
Waseem, Information, Asymmetric Incentives, or Withholding? Understanding the SelfEnforcement of Value-Added-Tax 4 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 7736, July 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422631. That study used the fact that the VAT was phased in
Pakistan to isolate what caused an increase in reported taxable sales. It found that what is
effectively a withholding-tax aspect to the VAT caused the increase. Id. at 34. Withholding
functions as a structural system, constraining noncompliance. See Lederman, Statutory
Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697 (explaining the use of withholding as a constraining
structural mechanism).
Waseem’s results may reflect the fact that, in a developing country in which
enforcement capacity is limited, information-transparency in the absence of governmental
capacity to actually use that information may not have a strong effect on compliance. See
Waseem, supra, at 10 (“[E]vidence has started to emerge recently that casts doubt on the
effectiveness of third-party information in [a] low-enforcement-capacity setting. . . .” (citing
Paul Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9 AM.
ECON. J. 144 (2017)). In other words, effective TPIR likely requires a belief on the part of
taxpayers that governments will receive and make use of the information. See Shekhar Mittal
& Aprajit Mahajan, VAT in Emerging Economies: Does Third Party Verification Matter? 33
(Working Paper, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029963 (finding in a study of Delhi,
India, that “results suggest that information and monitoring are complements in that we see
the strongest effect of improved third-party verification from firms that are more likely to
interact with other registered firms and are more closely monitored by the tax authority.”).
91. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524, 100 Stat. 2085, 2749.
The age threshold was eliminated in 1994, requiring all dependency claims to include an
identifying number. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
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vanished from the tax rolls in 1986, and the IRS recovered $3 billion
in revenue with a simple enforcement measure . . . . [T]his measure
worked because taxpayers who had found it easy to cheat
previously now feared that they could be caught in real-time.”92
This example shows that self-reporting can be an effective
compliance mechanism if the risk of detection is (or seems)
sufficiently high. TPIR—amounts reported by payors on forms
such as the W-2 or 1099—provides another example of an
information-sharing mechanism under which the taxpayer knows
that his or her actions can be observed by the government.93
Through TPIR, the IRS obtains information about payments from
payors. If the taxpayer’s reporting differs, the IRS may take action.
As indicated at the beginning of this Article, IRS studies estimate
that the percentage of dollars timely and voluntarily paid
is much higher with partial information reporting—and even
higher with complete information reporting—than without
information reporting.94
The key to TPIR’s effectiveness in increasing up-front
“voluntary” compliance is that it does not operate only after the
fact, in the enforcement context. Rather, each taxpayer receives a
copy of the W-2, 1099, and other information returns sent to the
government on his or her behalf, and is informed that a copy went
to the government.95 Accordingly, the taxpayer both benefits from
92. Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Stopping VAT Fraud with DICE—Digital
Invoice Customs Exchange, 72 TAX NOTES INT’L 637, 637 n.3 (2013) (citing STEVEN D. LEVITT &
STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF
EVERYTHING 238 (2006)).
93. See Thomas G. Vitez, Information Reporting and Withholding as Stimulants of
Voluntary Compliance, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF THE ABA TAX SECTION
INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TAX COMPLIANCE 191, 192 (Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983) (“With
an information document system in place, voluntary compliance rises dramatically because
the taxpayer is aware that the income is being reported to the IRS and that its omission from
the tax return is likely to trigger an examination.”).
94. See supra text accompanying note 2; see also TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS
2011–2013, supra note 2, at 3 (“Based on the TY 2011–2013 estimates, misreporting of income
amounts subject to substantial information reporting and withholding is 1 percent; of income
amounts subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding, it is 5 percent; and
of income amounts subject to little or no information reporting, such as nonfarm proprietor
income, it is 55 percent.”).
95. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-266, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COSTS
AND USES OF THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RETURNS 23 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/270/269658.pdf (“Information reporting involves third-party payers, such as
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the tax information provided by the third party and knows that
the government can observe any noncompliance with respect to
these payments.96
Information reporting thus decreases the perceived
opportunity to evade tax. It is not surprising that there is a strong
correlation between the presence or robustness of TPIR and
reporting compliance.97 Opportunity is an essential element of
fraud and similar wrongdoing. As one article stated, “[i]f
opportunity is not present, fraud is impossible.”98
Accordingly, contemporary tax scholarship has generally
emphasized the effectiveness of information reporting in fostering
compliance.99 For example, KKS argued that “third-party
information reporting by employers can sustain tax enforcement in
spite of low fines and low audit rates.”100 Professor Dina Pomeranz
employers or banks, filing returns with IRS and taxpayers after each calendar year that
provide information on a variety of taxpayers’ transactions and payments, such as wages
and miscellaneous income.”).
96. Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697 (“‘[I]nformation reporting,’
like red light cameras, provides information to the government, and it is information that the
taxpayer knows the government is receiving.”).
97. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-18-39, TAX GAP: IRS NEEDS SPECIFIC GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE 10 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-39.pdf (“As we have
previously reported, the extent to which individual income tax taxpayers accurately report
their income is closely aligned to the amount of income that is reported to them and to IRS
by third parties.”). TPIR is not relevant only for the U.S. federal income tax: a recent study
found that the introduction of state income tax withholding (and concomitant information
reporting) by firms has led to, on average, an increase in state income tax revenues of about
28 percent. See Libor Dušek & Sutirtha Bagchi, Third-Party Reporting and Tax Collections:
Evidence from the Introduction of Withholding for the State Personal Income Tax 3 (May 2,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1585119.
98. James A. Tackett et al., A Criminological Perspective of Tax Evasion, 110 TAX NOTES
654, 655 (2006). The Tackett et al. article describes accounting’s “fraud triangle” and briefly
applies it to tax evasion. See generally id.
99. See, e.g., Kleven et al., supra note 1, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion
is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat
successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Alex Raskolnikov,
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689,
729 (2009) (“It is no accident that for income subject to information reporting and
withholding at the source, the level of compliance approximates one hundred percent.
Gamers lacking the opportunity to game the system pay their taxes.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 219, 241.
A recent study found that a society’s “transition from self-employment to employeejobs explains growth in tax capacity” and attributes the increased tax capacity to the creation
of “third-party information trails.” Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the
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went farther, arguing that “understanding information flows is
central to effective taxation,” such that there can be “no taxation
without information.”101 One of the authors of this article has
likewise argued that information reporting is a “prime example” of
a technique to solve for information asymmetries.102
To be sure, information reporting is not a panacea and should
not apply to every transaction.103 Information transparency, which
relies on enforcement, is likely not as good as a system that
constrains compliance ex ante, structurally, particularly in countries
with low enforcement capacity.104 However, structural systems that
constrain tax compliance in the way that, for example, speed bumps
constrain vehicles from speeding, are not always possible to
implement. Not surprisingly, tax administrations and governments
have increasingly relied on information reporting and other
information-sharing mechanisms to spur compliance.105 In fact, the
global trend is toward more information sharing, not less.106

Modern Tax System 1 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 25502, 2019), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w25502.
101. Pomeranz, supra note 89, at 2539. TPIR, of course, is just one source of information
for the taxing authority. Self-reporting is another source of information, as is the
government’s enforcement activities. However, TPIR is particularly helpful because it
involves the report of a third party that can be compared to the taxpayer’s own report.
102. Lederman, supra note 5, at 1736; see also id. at 1735 (“The taxpayer’s perception of
the probability that cheating will be detected influences the compliance decision.
Accordingly, any information that the taxpayer knows the government has about the
taxpayer’s activities will foster honesty.”).
103. See id. at 1736, 1739–41 (mentioning costs as well as benefits, and proposing six
factors for identifying contexts in which information reporting may be successful).
104. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 696 (explaining the use of
structural systems in tax enforcement, and analogizing to speed bumps, which constrain
speeding structurally and thus require less enforcement than “speed limit” signs); see also
supra note 90 (mentioning the use of structural mechanisms, such as withholding taxes, that
foster tax compliance).
105. For discussion of the role that third-party reporting plays in many countries, see
section 2.2.2 of the National Reports for the 2018 European Association of Tax Law Professors
conference. Funda Başaran Yavaşlar & Johanna Hey, TAX TRANSPARENCY 6 (2018),
http://www.eatlp.org/congresses/310-national-reports-2018 (linking the questionnaire
and reports for 26 countries).
106. See Dušek & Bagchi, supra note 97, at 23 (“Expanding third-party information
reporting has been a common theme in the steps taken by revenue agencies from around the
world to reduce tax evasion.”).
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In the United States, for example, Congress has expanded
domestic TPIR mechanisms over time.107 It also enacted the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010 to tackle
offshore tax evasion.108 FATCA “requires that foreign financial
[i]nstitutions and certain other non-financial foreign entities report
on the foreign assets held by their U.S. account holders or be subject
to withholding on withholdable payments.”109
Beyond the United States, the Common Reporting Standard
(CRS), an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) project inspired by FATCA, provides
another example of expanded information-sharing. The CRS “calls
on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial
institutions and automatically exchange that information with
other jurisdictions on an annual basis.”110 “As of February 2020,
there are over 4000 bilateral exchange relationships activated with
respect to more than 100 jurisdictions committed to the CRS,” and
over 100 jurisdictions had signed on to a “multilateral Convention
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.”111 While the
simple fact that governments are adopting new informationreporting mechanisms would not by itself prove that such
mechanisms are effective, the emerging empirical data suggest that
they are working.112
107. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1749–51 (discussing the addition of Code section
6050W, and its accompanying Form 1099-K, as a method for gathering information on
income produced from online auction sites); id. at 1742 (mentioning the expansion of
securities broker information-reporting requirements under section 6045 to include
enhanced basis reporting).
108. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
§§ 501–541, 124 Stat. 71, 97–117.
109. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca (last reviewed Jan. 31, 2020).
110. OECD, What Is the CRS?, AUTOMATIC EXCH. PORTAL, http://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2020).
111. OECD, International Framework for the CRS, AUTOMATIC EXCH. PORTAL,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2020).
112. See Niels Johannesen et al., Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S.
Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No.
24366, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24366.pdf; id. at 38 (“[W]e find that these
[U.S.] foreign enforcement initiatives increased the number of individuals reporting foreign
accounts to the IRS by around 60,000 taxpayers, and increased the total amount of wealth
disclosed by about $120 billion.”); Robert Goulder, Should the U.S. Adopt the OECD’s Common
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2. Where TPIR may be less effective
The effectiveness of TPIR in many contexts does not, of course,
mean that TPIR should be deployed in every context. As Professor
Lederman argued in a 2010 article, certain types of transactions
lend themselves to TPIR better than others do.113 For example, she
argued that Form 1099-K, which was slated to be introduced in 2011
for certain sales (such as those conducted via credit cards) and
targeted at small businesses such as eBay sellers, held relatively
limited promise.114 That was because of the form’s high reporting
threshold (it only applies to sellers conducting over 200
transactions in a year and receiving over $20,000 in gross proceeds)
and the fact that it does not include tax basis information.115
In addition, the evidence that small businesses generally treat credit
card receipts as fairly transparent116 suggests that TPIR would
be less effective for transactions that consistently involve
such receipts.
Furthermore, as Joel Slemrod et al. pointed out in a 2017 article,
“[t]axpayers . . . can substitute expense over-reporting for receipt
under-reporting.”117 Thus, those authors stated that “[t]here is good
reason to suspect the effect of the Form 1099-K might differ from
that of existing information reporting.”118 The availability of
alternative arrangements bears on whether a proposed
Reporting Standard?, FORBES (June 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
taxanalysts/2016/06/29/should-the-u-s-adopt-the-oecds-common-reporting-standard/
#c97ffa744af8 (citing 2016 OECD estimate that the “rise of automatic information exchange
between national revenue bodies” had at that time “already shrunk the global tax gap by
more than €50 billion”); Robert W. Wood, Incredibly, 48 Nations Embrace FATCA to Reveal U.S.
Depositors, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2014, 8:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/
2014/04/07/incredibly-48-nations-embrace-fatca-to-reveal-u-s-depositors/#5a7cfcea1281
(describing FATCA as a “bigger success than anyone could have imagined”); see also
Elisa Casi et al., Cross-Border Tax Evasion After the Common Reporting Standard: Game Over? 4
(Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Research, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-036, 2019), http://ftp.zew.de/
pub/zew-docs/dp/dp18036.pdf (“[U]pon the CRS implementation at national level, crossborder deposits held in offshore countries decrease on average by 11.9% compared to nonoffshore countries.”).
113. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1739–41 (developing six factors and using them to
evaluate proposals for additional information reporting).
114. Id. at 1751–52.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying note 88.
117. Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business
Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (2017).
118. Id.
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information-reporting mechanism likely would succeed in
increasing compliance.119
Cui relies on the Slemrod et al. study in support of his critique
of the importance of TPIR.120 There are two problems with that.
First, as explained above, the context to which the 1099-K applies
predictably is a poor fit for information reporting. Second, the
Slemrod et al. study
estimate[d] that the introduction of the Form 1099-K prompted a
24% increase in reported receipts on average for [the subgroup of]
firms reporting receipts exactly equal to the 1099-K amount.
Strikingly, this group of firms also increased reported expenses by
13%. This offsetting moderated the impact of 1099-K on total tax
liability, even in groups strongly affected by 1099-K.121

Note that the authors found that the 1099-K initiative had a net
positive effect, not no effect. The effect was modest in magnitude,
which is reflective of the context in which it was applied—one that
is not typical of when information reporting is used successfully.
As discussed in section II.A above, existing evidence shows TPIR
generally to be very effective.122

119. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1740 (“To the extent the taxpayer has fewer ways to
cheaply avoid an information reporting requirement, it will be more effective and result in
fewer distortions.”).
120. Cui, supra note 6, at 121–27; see also id. at 121 (“The theory just advanced is
consistent with the very mixed evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR when implemented
beyond the realm of wage and financial income. A uniquely authoritative study on this topic
was carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the University of Michigan.”).
121. Slemrod et al., supra note 117, at 18–19.
Two studies in developing countries (which have less capacity to enforce the tax laws)
found much larger increases in offsets following changes in reported revenue. See Carrillo et
al., supra note 90, at 146 (“[F]irms [in Ecuador] increased reported costs by 96 cents for every
dollar of revenue adjustment.”); Zareh Asatryan & Andreas Peichl, Responses of Firms to Tax,
Administrative and Accounting Rules: Evidence from Armenia 30–31 (CESifo, Working Paper,
Nov. 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6754.html (finding that reported
income increased after audit but “every additional dollar of reported income in years t to t+1
is, on average, matched by a 0.90 dollar increase in reported deductions”). Carrillo explains
that “the effectiveness of third-party reporting in developing economies may be limited
along two dimensions. . . . [One is that] taxpayers may respond to third-party information
by making offsetting adjustments on less verifiable margins of the tax return, thereby
reducing the effect of such information on tax revenue.” Carrillo et al., supra, at 145.
122. See supra Section II.A.
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Value-Added Taxes and Information Sharing

An important tax used in most advanced economies (but not in
the United States123) is the VAT (value-added tax). A VAT is a tax
on goods and services. It “is conceptually similar to a[] [retail sales
tax], but it is imposed via a mechanism that involves every stage of
production and distribution.”124 This means that instead of all of the
tax being collected upon final sale to the consumer, pieces of the tax
are collected along the entire supply chain. Each business in the
supply chain is thus subject to VAT.
Because Cui cited the VAT as an example of a tax not subject to
TPIR,125 it is important to understand how these taxes work and the
role that third-party reporting plays in VAT administration. In
terms of the mechanics of a VAT, Itai Grinberg has provided an
example involving the sale of a case of wine to a consumer for
$100.126 As a baseline, if, as in his example, a 20% retail sales tax
were imposed (which is a much higher rate than U.S. retail sales
taxes127), the tax due on the sale to the consumer would be $20 (for
a total cost to the consumer of $120).128 Under a 20% VAT, the
consumer still pays $120 and the government is still entitled to $20.
However, the $20 of tax is collected in pieces along the way, rather
than only from the retailer:

123. See Sarah Birnbaum, Why Some Experts Want the US to Adopt a VAT and Other Tax
Lessons from Around the World, PRI’S THE WORLD (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-26/why-some-experts-want-us-adopt-vat-andother-tax-lessons-around-world (quoting James Hines as stating, “More than 170 countries
have value-added taxes . . . . Really, the United States is the only country that doesn’t.”).
124. Itai Grinberg, Where Credit is Due: Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for a Partial
Replacement VAT, 63 TAX L. REV. 309, 313 (2010).
125. See Cui, supra note 6, at 104 (“The value added tax (VAT) . . . does not involve
information reporting . . . . [F]irms generally do not transmit information about payments to
and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead
aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax returns.”). But cf. ALAN SCHENK,
VICTOR THURONYI & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 461 (2d ed.
2015) (describing China’s VAT, under which “tax authorities compare transaction
information submitted by sellers (through their IC [integrated circuit] cards) with
information gathered from invoices submitted by purchasers in claiming input tax credits”).
126. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 314.
127. See Janelle Cammenga, State and Local Sales Tax Rates, 2019, TAX FOUND.,
https://taxfoundation.org/sales-tax-rates-2019/ (“The five states with the highest average
combined state and local sales tax rates are Tennessee (9.47 percent), Louisiana (9.45 percent),
Arkansas (9.43 percent), Washington (9.17 percent), and Alabama (9.14 percent).”).
128. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 315.
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A winemaker buys grapes from a grape grower and uses them to
produce a case of wine for sale to retailers. The winemaker buys
grapes and other supplies from the grape grower at a cost of $30
per case of wine before tax. The winemaker sells each case of
wine for $70 before tax. The retailer sells a case of wine for $100
before tax. . . .
. . . Because the VAT is charged on all sales of taxable goods
and services (“taxable supplies”), the grape grower collects 20%
VAT on her sales of grapes, charging the winemaker $6 of tax on
each $30 of sales. The grape grower remits the $6 of VAT to the
government. The winemaker charges the retailer $84 ($70 + $14
[20% of $70] of VAT) per case of wine. Instead of sending all $14
of VAT to the government, however, the winemaker subtracts the
$6 of VAT paid by the winemaker to the grape grower from the
$14 collected in VAT, and remits $8 to the government per case of
wine sold. Similarly, instead of remitting $20 per case of wine sold
to the government, the retailer subtracts the $14 of VAT paid by
the retailer to the winemaker from the $20 collected in VAT from
the consumer, and remits $6 to the government per case of wine
sold. The tax authority receives $20 in total—$6 from the grape grower,
$8 from the winemaker, and $6 from the retailer.129

The example above includes calculations of the VAT due.130
There are two principal methods for calculating VAT, the creditinvoice method and the subtraction method, with almost all
countries that have VATs using the former.131 The main substantive
difference between the two methods is that a credit-invoice VAT
has an invoice requirement.132 That is, while registered businesses
may reduce their VAT liability by a credit equal to the VAT they
paid to registered suppliers, taking the credit requires an invoice
from the supplier.133 Grinberg explains that “[t]he invoice

129. Id. at 314–15 (emphasis added).
130. The example above uses the credit-invoice approach. Id. at 309. There is another
possible approach; the two approaches are described in infra text accompanying
notes 131–33.
131. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 309. “Japan is the only developed economy that utilizes
some subtraction-method features to impose a VAT.” Id.
132. Id. at 310.
133. Id. at 313; see also Michel Aujean, Towards a Modern EU VAT System: Associating
VIVAT and Electronic Invoicing, 20 EUR. CMTY. TAX REV. 211, 215 (2011) (“In most invoicecredit VAT systems, the invoice plays a central role as it is the commercial document that
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requirement makes the VAT partially self-policing because
registered traders demand invoices in order to claim the input
credits that reduce their own VAT liability.”134 This reporting
involves third-party information.135 In fact, third parties are
defines the essential terms of the sale on which VAT will apply and which establishes both
the VAT due by the seller and the VAT deductible by the purchaser.”).
In their book on the VAT, Cui and his co-authors note that “[s]ome countries have
undertaken ambitious programs to match invoices for input credits to output tax reported
by the purported suppliers.” SCHENK, THURONYI & CUI, supra note 125, at 339. They critique
this matching effort, stating that “[s]uch an exercise can, however, be problematic, in part
because many mismatches are a result of errors rather than evasion.” Id. Yet, catching
reporting errors is the goal of matching, and an error in the taxpayer’s favor is equally costly
to the government whether it is intentional or inadvertent. In addition, a review of this book
observes that the book’s “discussion of fraud is rather cursory given the worries (for good or
bad reasons) about VAT fraud, especially in the EU. Missing trader (or carousel) fraud is the
most prominent but by no means the only form of VAT fraud, as shown [by] Keen and Smith
(2006) in their classic (but uncited) paper on VAT and sales tax fraud.” Pierre-Pascal
Gendron, Book Review: Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach, Second Edition by Alan
Schenk, Victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 247 (2016).
134. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 313; see also id. at 314 (“The prospect of this type of
third-party reporting may induce businesses to comply more fully with the law.”). In
addition, the fact that the businesses earlier in the chain have in effect withheld part of the
tax, which can be claimed by the businesses later in the chain, see supra text accompanying
note 129, increases the incentive to comply. See Waseem, supra note 90, at 33. Waseem finds
that “VAT is indeed self-enforcing. Taxable sales reported by manufacturers rise
considerably as their exposure to VAT deepens.” Id. at 4.
VAT invoices are thus useful with respect to the business-to-business part of the
supply chain. However, the final sale to the consumer traditionally was not transparent to
the government because the system did not call for the consumer to report to the government
the total price or amount of VAT he or she paid. Bahro A. Berhan & Glenn P. Jenkins, The
Economic Cost of “Clever” Tax Administration Ideas, 5 REV. SOC., ECON. & BUS. STUD. 89, 90
(2004) [hereinafter Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost] (“If the seller agrees with the buyer not
to levy VAT on its final sale, then the government bears the full loss of tax revenue.”). Years
ago, some countries undertook measures to increase enforcement at the retail stage of the
transaction by using the consumer as a third party. Id. at 90–91; see also infra text
accompanying notes 379–91 (discussing lotteries using consumers’ receipts). For example, in
1986, Bolivia “create[d] another tax—a withholding tax on the payroll of employees and
pensioners—which can be reduced or eliminated by deducting the VAT paid on purchases,
documented by official VAT invoices.” Bahro A. Berhan & Glenn P. Jenkins, The High Costs
of Controlling GST and VAT Evasion, 53 CANADIAN TAX J. 720, 724 (2005). Similarly, Turkey
introduced a VAT-refund approach for consumers in 1986, id., and Northern Cyprus
adopted that approach in 1996, id. at 723.
135. See Jianjun Li & Xuan Wan, Does VAT Have Higher Tax Compliance Than a Turnover
Tax? Evidence from China, INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. § 2.3 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797019-09567-4 (“It is generally considered that the VAT system possesses a self-enforcing
mechanism . . . . Each inter-firm transaction is recorded by the buyer and the seller, which
generates the third-party information. The third-party information dramatically increases the
possibility that under-reporting sales and over-reporting costs will be detected.” (emphasis
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so important to the VAT process that some countries have
begun imposing third-party liability in VAT fraud cases, such as
by “refusing the deductibility of input VAT to traders where
the purchaser of those goods had turned out to be a (missing
trader) fraudster.”136
With respect to the role of third-party reporting, Cui claims that
“[u]nder the VAT . . . firms generally do not transmit information
about payments to and specific transactions with vendors and
customers to the government, but instead aggregate transaction
information into lines on simple tax returns.”137 He adds, “[t]he
existence of a paper trail does help audits, but it does not
automatically provide the government with any information before
an audit.”138 Hemel echoes Cui’s analysis of VAT enforcement,
stating in part that “the [VATs] that constitute a large source of
revenue in most countries other than the United States rely
primarily upon first party reporting. . . . Cui notes that in fact, firms
generally do not submit information to the government regarding
specific transactions.”139 However, these descriptions both (1) are
out of date and (2) only partially capture how VATs used to
be administered.
Decades ago, VATs did rely significantly on first-party
reporting. For example, a book authored by Liam Ebrill et al. and
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2001
explained that “[u]ntil the early 1990s, all countries willing to
introduce a VAT broadly followed the same approach—
administrative preparations for implementation of the new tax
were always based on the assumption that the VAT is a selfassessed tax.”140 That book further described VATs as closely linked

added)); see also Waseem, supra note 90, at 10 (using the phrase “Third-Party Information” as
a heading).
136. Rita de la Feria, Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law 23 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus.
Taxation, Working Paper, 2018), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/7281/1/WP1802.pdf. Professor
de la Feria critiques this “responsibilisation” approach. See id. at 29–31.
137. Cui, supra note 6, at 104.
138. Id. at 104 n.48.
139. Hemel, supra note 10. Hemel adds, “This point surprised me: I had assumed that
credit invoice method VATs required firms to report information about individual
transactions with counterparties, against whose returns those reports could be checked.” Id.
140. LIAM EBRILL ET AL., THE MODERN VAT 138 (2001).
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with self-assessment,141 meaning that taxpayers “calculate and pay
their own tax liabilities.”142
That early VATs were premised upon self-assessment did not
preclude third-party reporting, however. For example, the U.S.
federal income tax involves both self-assessment143 (taxpayer
calculation of the tax liability) and third-party reporting of wages,
interest, and other amounts.144 And the backdrop of the VAT,
according to Ebrill et al., was the role of third-party invoices in the
supply chain: “As background, the VAT literature initially
emphasized the self-checking mechanism of the VAT (through the
chain of invoices that are required at each stage through
the retailer).”145
Taxpayers were not the only ones making use of these
invoices. Even decades ago, countries were using them to
facilitate enforcement:
[T]ax departments usually [would] maintain a system of official
invoices where the invoices/receipts are numbered and the
quantity of invoices/receipts issued to each firm is recorded.
Under such a system, a self-policing mechanism exist[ed] with
respect to the payment of the VAT on the sales of goods and
services between one business and another.146

That is, a business purchasing a supply generally would want
an official invoice in order to be able to support a deduction for the
VAT paid.147 The selling business supplying the invoice would then
141. Id. (“In many countries, the development of self-assessment is closely linked to the
rise of the VAT.”).
142. Id. In 2009, one of the authors of The Modern VAT referred to that book as “now
starting to show its age . . . .” Michael Keen, What Do (and Don’t) We Know About
the Value Added Tax? A Review of Richard M. Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron’s The VAT in
Developing and Transitional Countries, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 159 (2009).
143. Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This Return Might Be Correct but Probably Isn’t,”
29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 649 (2010) (“As has been recognized by the Supreme Court, the system
of self-assessment is the bedrock principal [sic] of our income tax laws . . . .”).
144. See supra text accompanying note 4.
145. EBRILL ET AL., supra note 140, at 140. Ebrill et al. add that the chain of VAT invoices
“could be seen as consistent with implementing self-assessment procedures—if the VAT is a
‘self-enforced’ tax, it should also be ‘self-assessed.’” Id.
146. Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost, supra note 134, at 90.
147. See Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and
What Can Be Done?, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 861, 865 (2006). Keen and Smith explain:
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be more likely to remit the VAT collected because it would know
that the buyer (the third party) planned to report the VAT it paid.148
The registered invoices allowed authorities to monitor the
businesses in a supply chain.149
Cui’s assertion that firms liable for VAT “generally do not
transmit information about payments to and specific transactions
with vendors and customers to the government” is at best an
incomplete and outdated description of VAT administration.150
Even in the Ebrill et al. survey that was conducted over 20 years
ago,151 “[o]nly 42 percent of the surveyed countries (13 out of 31)
ha[d] implemented”152 what the book termed “modern collection
procedures (using simple filing and payment forms and a selfassessment system).”153 More of the countries, even at that time “(15
out of 31), while using self-assessment procedures,” had imposed
additional requirements.154 “In these [latter] countries, the forms
may [have] include[d] several pages, with taxpayers sometimes
requested to attach additional documents (such as copies of
invoices and import declarations) . . . .”155

[T]here is an important sense in which the VAT is self-correcting, if not selfenforcing: if for some reason a supply to some registered trader escapes VAT, that
missing VAT will be recovered at the next stage in the VAT charged by that trader
on their own sales, since there will in that case be no credit to offset against their
liability. For all these reasons, traders selling to other businesses have an incentive
to register to charge the VAT even if their annual turnover is below the threshold
at which VAT registration is mandatory . . . .
Id.
148. See Keen, supra note 142, at 162 (“One argument sometimes made for the VAT, for
example, is that it can help to propagate compliance: if one firm is registered for the VAT,
then anyone supplying to it will also want to register and become VAT compliant (because
then they can themselves reclaim any VAT they have been charged, whilst the VAT they
have to charge the final seller will simply be credited or refunded by the latter).”).
149. Id. Writing in 2011, Aujean advocated for electronic invoicing. Aujean, supra note
133, at 215. Aujean adds, “I do believe that ‘the future of VAT is digital’ . . . .” Id. at 216
(quoting Richard T. Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud in the EU: A Digital VAT Solution, 42 TAX NOTES
INT’L 443 (2006)).
150. Cui, supra note 6, at 104.
151. EBRILL ET AL., supra note 140, at 139 (referring to “the countries surveyed in
Chapter 6”); id. at 62 (stating regarding the survey that “[m]ost questionnaires were
completed in Spring/Summer 1998”).
152. Id. at 139.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Ebrill et al. criticized the approach of these latter countries,
referring to these reporting requirements as “complex” and
involving “excessive data requirements.”156 Their concern was with
compliance costs157 in light of their apparent doubt that taxpayers
would take advantage of opportunities to evade.158 But it is
one thing to assert as a normative matter that detailed reporting is
too costly or inefficient. It is another thing to claim as an empirical
matter that detailed reporting is atypical. The Ebrill et al. study
reflects that, even in 1998, more of the countries surveyed
required additional documentation than did not, a factual point
that Cui’s argument overlooks.159 And, as discussed below, in
recent years, technological developments have led to much more
line-item reporting.160
In 2006, Richard Ainsworth argued:
The future of the VAT is digital. In the foreseeable future, all
VAT processes will be automated. VAT determinations,
156. Id.
157. See id. (referring to additional filing requirements as “significantly increasing
compliance costs”).
158. For example, in its discussion under “What Are the Main Reasons for Resistance
to Self-Assessment?,” id. at 142, under the claim “Most businesses underreport their tax
liabilities,” the Ebrill et al. book responds:
This has also been mentioned in countries in transition. In these countries, a
number of officials seem to be firmly convinced that taxpayers cannot be trusted,
especially those in the emerging private sector. However, such reactions should
gradually decrease as senior tax officials improve their experience with basic tax
administration principles of market-based economies and taxpayers become more
familiar with the new tax laws.
Id. at 143. This suggests the views that the problems are (1) a lack of trust by tax
administrators (rather than actual noncompliance) and (2) imperfect compliance resulting
from inexperience. These explanations give little credit to the insights of administrators
regarding the motivations or actions of taxpayers. They also ignore the fact that “[s]elfemployed individuals are widely known for evasion of the income tax, and tax
administrators throughout the world have searched for ways to induce the self-employed to
comply with their tax obligations.” Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding:
A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 108 (1990). VATs
have proven to be subject to fraud both in developing and developed countries. See, e.g.,
Keen & Smith, supra note 147, at 862 (“Sri Lanka, for example, has recently lost substantial
revenue—reportedly about ten percent of its net VAT receipts—from a single fraudulent
episode. Indeed, the more pervasive informality in developing countries, and typically
higher levels of corruption, suggest that fraud and evasion are likely to be even greater
problems there.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 865–68 (providing a typology of VAT fraud); see
also Ainsworth, supra note 149, at 444–45 (explaining the mechanics of carousel fraud).
159. See supra text accompanying note 155.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 163–78.
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collection, the remission of funds, as well as all reporting, audit,
and refund activities will be digitized. Certified proprietary and
third-party software systems will perform all critical VAT functions for
large and small taxpayers at minimal cost under real-time compliance
conditions. Government-to-government information exchange
will be immediate.
The European Union is transitioning to a digital VAT now.161

And, in fact, as early as 2005, “the 38 member states of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development”
agreed to162 what is “[o]ne of the most well-known real-time
reporting format[s] . . .[—]the SAF-T file which stands for
‘Standard Audit File for Tax.’”163 Importantly, “[t]he idea behind
SAF-T is that companies provide governments with full
transparency towards the company’s business transactions. This
will enable tax inspectors to audit companies on an ongoing basis, and
have line-item transaction data available at any time.”164
SAF-T is thus an electronic file—typically an XML file—that
“contains reliable accounting data which has been directly
exported from the company’s accounting system. It will basically
give the tax authorities . . . easy access to the company’s data in an
easily readable format.”165 SAF-T is a valuable tool for tax
administrators to conduct third-party verification. “For example, if
Company A makes a taxable supply to Company B, Company B’s
tax inspector will be able to confirm whether Company A has paid
161. Ainsworth, supra note 149, at 443 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Brazil has used digital invoices “for securing internal data for cross-border supplies
among the 27 Brazilian states since 2006.” Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638. Brazil
followed a process of making digital invoices mandatory for companies of a certain size, and
progressively lowered the size threshold to include more businesses. Id. “[B]y the end of 2010
there were over 500,000 firms issuing digitally signed, cross-border NF-e invoices. The
system is fully in place today [(November 2013)].” Id. at 638 n.6.
162. Standard Audit File for Tax (SAF-T): Online Tax Reporting Forces Transparency, SOVOS
(Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter SOVOS], https://sovos.com/blog/standard-audit-file-tax-saf-tonline-tax-reporting-forces-transparency/.
163. Sarah Ahlskog & Tuija Kokko, Farewell Paper VAT Returns – Digitalization Hits Also
the World of VAT, EY (May 29, 2019), https://yrityselaman360blog.ey.com/2019/05/29/
farewell-paper-vat-returns-digitalization-hits-also-the-world-of-vat/. This is not the only
digital reporting format for this data. See id. (“There are also other similar kind of real-time
reporting requirements within the EU countries, such as the SII (‘Immediate Supply of
Information’) in Spain and live VAT invoice reporting in Hungary.”).
164. SOVOS, supra note 162 (emphasis added).
165. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163.
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over the VAT, before allowing the VAT refund to Company B.”166
The first country to adopt SAF-T was Poland, in 2016.167 Now, a
number of countries use SAF-T for digital reporting: “The SAF-T
scheme has currently been implemented in Austria, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and France.”168 Norway introduced
mandatory SAF-T filing effective January 1, 2020.169
Technology has facilitated line-item reporting. A survey
conducted by accounting firm Ernst & Young in 2013 found that
“[i]n 23 countries VAT/GST [Goods & Services Tax] payers must
provide information about their individual transactions to the tax
administration.”170 In addition, “[i]n 16 countries VAT/GST payers
must submit individual tax invoices to the tax administration.”171
Though the contents of these invoices vary somewhat depending
on the particular country’s VAT laws, they generally include
supplier information, recipient information, and details about the
taxable transaction sufficient to put the taxing authority on notice
of the transaction.172

166. SOVOS, supra note 162.
167. Id.
168. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163.
169. Pers Evers & John Henry Askevold Rosseland, Norwegian Standard Audit File – Tax
(SAF-T) from 1 January 2020, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/no/no/pages/tax/
articles/saf-t/english/saf-t-er-vedtatt.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); see also The New SAF-T
Standard Format in Norway Also Apply to NUF / Norwegian Foreign Enterprise, TIMEVAT
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.timevat.com/en/the-new-saf-t-standard-format-in-norwayalso-apply-to-nuf-norwegian-foreign-enterprise/.
170. EY GLOBAL SURVEY, VAT/GST ELECTRONIC FILING AND DATA EXTRACTION 5
(2014) (emphasis added), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_VATGST_electronic_filing_and_data_extraction/$FILE/EY-vat-gst-electronic-filing-and-dataextraction.pdf. Six of the 23 are European Union (EU) countries. Id. at 20.
171. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Five of the 16 are EU countries (Greece, Hungary,
Portugal, Spain, and the UK). Id. at 32–33.
172. See, e.g., VAT Invoicing Rules, TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, https://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/business/vat/eu-vat-rules-topic/vat-invoicing-rules_en (last visited Feb.
4, 2020) (European Commission VAT invoicing rules, requiring in all cases, e.g., the
supplier’s and customer’s names and addresses; the quantity/extent and type of goods or
services; and the unit price of goods or services, excluding taxes, discounts, and rebates);
VAT Record Keeping, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/vat-record-keeping/vat-invoices (last
visited Feb. 4, 2020) (describing VAT invoices required in the United Kingdom, which
require, except in the simplified invoice for retail supplies, such things as the supplier’s and
customer’s names and addresses, a description of the goods or services, and the quantity and
VAT-exclusive price of each item).
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And the trend continues to be to require detailed VAT
reporting.173 Currently, the European Union requires, among other
things, what is known as a “Recapitulative Statement”174 or “EC
sales list”175 to accompany the VAT return for sales within the EU,
for both goods and services.176
This listing, filed either monthly or quarterly, provides details of
sales or transfers of goods and services to other VAT registered
companies in other EU countries. The tax offices in the EU use
ESLs [EC Sales Lists] to confirm that VAT is being properly and
fully declared by all parties in cross-border transactions.
The listing applies to both goods and services. 177

In addition, Intrastat reporting, originally used to track the
movement of goods within the E.U. for statistical purposes
“[i]ncreasingly . . . is also being used as a check on potential VAT
fraud.”178 One writer explains that “businesses are now asked to
reconcile their VAT returns to their Intrastat filings, in order to
identify inconsistencies in their VAT compliance.”179 Intrastat
requires numerous details on the goods, and “Intrastat reporting is
almost always monthly across the EU. Filings are generally
undertaken at the same time as the VAT return, and are sent [to]

173. A report by Avalara states: “The traditional periodic VAT return is headed for
extinction. . . . The underlying momentum has been to move from the self-assessed, historic
VAT return towards tax authorities being able to verify live VAT calculations in each
invoice.” AVALARA, DEATH OF THE EUROPEAN VAT RETURN 2–3, https://www.avalara.com/
vatlive/en/white-papers/death-of-the-european-vat-return.html.
174. Richard Ainsworth, Black Swans: Recapitulative Statements/VIES (VAT) & Use Tax
Reciprocity (RST), 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 275, 275 (2012) (“The EU has developed a data-sharing
mechanism involving recapitulative statements by origin state sellers and a VAT Information
Exchange System (VIES) that shares this information with the destination state.”); id. at 276
(“VAT registered suppliers in the EU are required to file recapitulative statements (also
known as EU sales lists or VIES statements).”).
175. What Is an EC Sales List?, VATGLOBAL, https://www.vatglobal.com/reportingobligations-vat-guides/what-is-an-ec-sales-list (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Intrastat Declarations, AVALARA [hereinafter Intrastat Declarations], https://www.
avalara.com/vatlive/en/eu-vat-rules/eu-vat-returns/intrastat-declarations.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020).
179. Giulia Vettore, Intrastat Declaration Made Easy: The Who, Why and How of This EU
Legal Requirement, ODOO, https://www.odoo.com/blog/business-hacks-1/post/intrastatdeclaration-made-easy-the-who-why-and-how-of-this-eu-legal-requirement-264 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2020).
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the appropriate statistical office for the country concerned.”180
The existence of these overlapping regulatory reporting regimes—
the EC sales list, Intrastat and VAT returns—should be expected to
increase overall VAT compliance.181
Moreover, although different countries’ VATs have different
procedures,182 the modern approach is to require digital real-time
reporting of transactions to the government. This approach supplies
transaction-by-transaction information to the tax administration.
Rwanda adopted digital real-time reporting in 2013,183
China introduced it in 2015,184 Hungary launched its system on

180. Intrastat Declarations, supra note 178.
Intrastat filings require details of all dispatches (sales) of goods to other EU
countries, plus the arrivals (purchase). Details required of each transaction
include: Description of the goods; Commodity code of the goods; Quantity and
value of the goods; Delivery terms; Country of departure and arrival (using
country codes); Any shipping costs. . . . There are annual [Intrastat] reporting
threshold[s] for each EU country . . . .
Id.; see also Paul Carrier, An Assessment of Regional Economic Integration Agreements After the
Uruguay Round, 9 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 27 n.169 (1996) (“The [European Economic
Community] established a data collecting system called ‘intrastat’ for the purpose of
measuring trade between member states and trade with non-member states.” (citations
omitted)); Robin Maxwell et al., Worldwide VAT Update, 17 J. INT’L TAX’N 60, at *4 (2006) (“EU
member states must collect and report information on intra-Community trade for statistical
purposes (these reports are known as INTRASTAT).”).
181. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing overlapping sources of information
transparency at large firms).
182. See ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE VAT, GST AND SALES TAX GUIDE (2019),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-2019-Worldwide-VAT-GST-and-SalesTax-Guide/$FILE/ey-2019-Worldwide-VAT-GST-and-Sales-Tax-Guide.PDF
(“summariz[ing] indirect tax systems in 124 jurisdictions”). In Europe, for instance, a Council
Directive, located at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:
02006L0112-20190116, sets forth a detailed framework for a European VAT. EU member
states incorporate the Directive into their statutory schemes, with some discretion.
183. See Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638; Eva Ghirmai et al., The Incidence
and Impact of Electronic Billing Machines for VAT in Rwanda, INT’L GROWTH CTR. BLOG (Apr.
15, 2016), https://www.theigc.org/blog/the-incidence-and-impact-of-electronic-billingmachines-for-vat-in-rwanda/ (“In August 2013, the Rwandan government passed
legislation requiring VAT-registered firms to provide customers with a certified Electronic
Billing Machine (EBM) receipt for each sale. EBMs record and transmit all sales transaction
data to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) in real time . . . .”).
184. STATE ADMIN. OF TAXATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, STATE TAXATION
ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT 85 (2018), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/download/
pdf/swnb2018en.pdf (“In 2015, the STA [State Taxation Administration] promoted an
updated VAT invoice system across China . . . . The new system shifts from the offline
invoicing and regular reporting to online, real-time uploading of information to
tax administrations.”).
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July 1, 2018,185 and Italy implemented its system in January 2019.186
Spain implemented near-real-time reporting in 2017.187 Some
developed countries have been slower to move to digital real-time
reporting, but a range of counties have done so, and others are
expected to follow soon.188
185. Hungary Real-Time Invoice Reporting, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/
vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/hungary/hungary-real-time-invoice-reporting.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“From 1 July 2018 Hungary has introduced real-time, electronic
reporting of domestic B2B [business-to-business] sales invoice data. The anti-VAT fraud
reporting measure applies to all VAT registered businesses, resident or foreign, on invoices
with a VAT element of HUF 100,000 (approximately €320) or more.”).
186. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163 (“Italy also introduced the mandatory einvoicing system in January 2019 which requires all companies established in Italy to issue
and submit domestic invoices electronically in the Italian Revenue Agency’s e-invoicing
platform called ‘SDI’.”); see also Digitisation of VAT Reporting, AVALARA VATLIVE, (Apr. 5,
2018), https://www.vatlive.com/vat-news/digitisation-of-vat-reporting/.
187. See Joe Stanley-Smith, How Spanish SII Is Impacting Companies: Duracell Case Study,
INT’L TAX REV. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.vertexinc.com/sites/default/files/201803/International%20Tax%20Review%20Duracell%20Case%20Study.pdf
(“Spain
has
introduced groundbreaking requirements for companies to file transactional data in near
real-time . . . . its implementation [is] on July 1 2017.”); Real Time Reporting for VAT in Spain,
LEXIDY (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.lawyersspain.eu/blog/real-time-reporting-for-vat-inspain (“According to the new regime, taxpayers have to report within four days those
transactions for which an invoice was either issued or received. This applies to those
companies that have a turnover which exceeds 6 million EUR per year: large companies in
Spain, groups and those types of companies that file monthly VAT returns.”).
188. See Stanley-Smith, supra note 187, at 2–3 (“‘[I]t’s clearly a trend in the market to go
to a more digital relationship between taxpayer and government,’” said “Danny Vermeiren,
director of VAT at Vertex.”); Richard Asquith, Albania Live E-Invoice Reporting 2020, AVALARA
(Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/albania-live-e-invoicereporting-2020.html (“Albania is to require all taxpayers to submit B2B and B2C [businessto-consumer] invoices in real-time from 1 January 2020. From 2020, all invoices must be live
reported to the tax authorities.”); Greece VAT Live Reporting, AVALARA, https://www.
avalara.com/vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/greece/greek-vat-live-reporting.html
(last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (“Greece is likely to introduce live invoice reporting and e-invoices
in January 2020. This will include daily reporting of B2B and B2C invoices through the tax
authority’s TAXISnet portal. E-invoices for B2G [business-to-government] transactions have
already been mandated for mid-2019.”).
Several countries that do not yet have real-time reporting have taken steps in that
direction, such as by “imposing requirements such as the electronic submission of VAT/GST
declarations.” Gijsbert Bulk, Indirect Tax in 2017, EY (2017), http://www.ey.com/
gl/en/services/tax/vat—gst-and-other-sales-taxes/ey-indirect-tax-in-2017 (also mentioning
the digital steps taken by Belarus, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, French Polynesia, Hungary,
Moldova, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Spain, and Uruguay). The United Kingdom has not
implemented digital real-time reporting, but beginning on April 1, 2019, “requires VAT
registered businesses with taxable turnover above the VAT registration threshold to keep
records in digital form and file their VAT Returns using software.” HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
VAT NOTICE 700/22, MAKING TAX DIGITAL FOR VAT ¶ 1.2 (2019), https://www.gov.uk/
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Digital real-time reporting may apply to the business-tobusiness part of the supply chain and/or to the business-toconsumer stage.189 The latter stage traditionally has been less
transparent due to the fact that the consumer often lacked an
incentive to report the transaction to the tax administration (though
some countries have tried to address that problem).190 Digital realtime reporting at the business-to-consumer stage makes that final
stage in the supply chain more transparent to the tax
administration through smart cash-register technology: the cash
register (or its programmer) serves as the third party transmitting
transaction-by-transaction data to the government in real time.191
The spread of digital real-time reporting in both the businessto-business and business-to-consumer parts of the supply chain
likely speaks to the enforcement advantages that timely, detailed
transaction data offers to tax administrators, particularly in
countries that have faced enforcement challenges.192 A study
focused on Rwanda found that after Rwanda adopted digital
real-time reporting, VAT payments increased substantially.193
government/publications/vat-notice-70022-making-tax-digital-for-vat/vat-notice-70022making-tax-digital-for-vat.
189. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 185 (referring to Hungary’s application of
digital real-time reporting to business-to-business transactions); infra text accompanying
note 194 (referring to Italy’s application of digital real-time reporting to both business-tobusiness and business-to-consumer transactions).
190. See supra text accompanying note 134 (mentioning some techniques countries used
to try to address this problem).
191. The authors thank Tina Ehrke-Rabel for this insight.
192. One article, quoting “an international tax partner and global technology tax leader
at EY in the United States,” explains that “anti-corruption, electronic submissions and data
analytics have been identified as a way to push fraud out of the system faster. ‘That’s why
you are seeing it in countries that tend to have had a more difficult history with tax fraud
and corruption’ . . . .” Amelia Schwanke, Tax Technology: A Brave New World, 27 INT’L TAX
REV. 24, 27, 30 (2016).
193. Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638 n.6.
In 2014, the International Growth Center (IGC) conducted research on the
incidence of EBM for VAT in Rwanda and found out that, from 2013 to September
2014, EBM contributed to an increase of VAT payment by 6.5 per cent. More to
this, the VAT collected on sales declared increased by 20 per cent in 2015 when
compared to 2014, while in 2016 (January to August), VAT collected from sales
declared registered an increase of 12 per cent compared to the same period in 2015.
Eugène Kwibuka, RRA: Use of EBM Will Soon Be Mandatory for Every Business, NEW TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2016), www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/204315/.
Russia provides an analogous example:
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Similarly, “Italy is projecting an annual increase in VAT revenues
of €4 billion for 2019 following the January extension of its
SdI [Sistema di Interscambio] electronic invoicing regime to
domestic B2B [business-to-business] and B2C [business-toconsumer] transactions.”194
Chile, the focus of the study of VAT compliance by Pomeranz
that Cui’s article implicitly counters in its title, initially made digital
reporting optional.195 Thus, at the time of Pomeranz’s study, 2008,
“[i]n Chile, as in many countries, most firms [did] not have to
submit [the firm’s book of purchases] to the tax authority. Only
very large firms, and what was at the time of the study a small
number who [chose] to use an online filing system, [did] so.”196
Digital reporting was made mandatory after Pomeranz’s study was
completed, by a 2014 amendment to the law.197 It is not surprising
that digital, real-time reporting is the trend: increased government
access to information in real time not only increases enforcement
capability, it also deters wrongdoing in the first instance.198
Thus, Cui’s assertion that third-party reporting does not apply
to VATs cannot be reconciled with the empirical evidence.

Starting on January 1 2015, taxpayers in Russia were required to submit VAT
transactional data along with their electronic VAT returns. That year, domestic
VAT revenues increased by more than 12%, the equivalent of around $4 billion
(RUB 267 billion). Was this driven by an improving economy? Perhaps more likely
is the fact that the Russian Federal Tax Service had delivered on its vision for a
nationwide VAT analytics platform.
Jon Dobell, The Future of Tax Technology Is Now, 28 INT’L TAX REV. 41, 41 (2017).
194. Richard Asquith, Italy SdI VAT E-Invoicing Raises €4bn, AVALARA (July 10, 2019),
https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/italy-sdi-vat-e-invoicing-raises—
4bn.html. The application to business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions is
an extension because use of Italy’s SdI electronic invoicing regime “has been required of sales
to government bodies since June 2014.” Italy Sistema di Interscambio (SdI) Real-Time E-Invoices,
AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/italy/italy-sdireal-time-e-invoices.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
195. See Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, GCC VAT: The Intra-Gulf Trade
Problem, 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 315, 324 (2016).
196. Pomeranz, supra note 89, at 2543.
197. See Introduce Modificaciones a la Legislación Tributaria en Materia de Factura Electrónica
y Dispone Otras Medidas Que Indica, BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE (Oct. 1,
2014), https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1058909 (providing the text of the law);
see also Chile Extends DTE Rollout Deadline for SMEs and Microbusinesses, THE PAYPERS (Oct.
31, 2014), https://www.thepaypers.com/e-invoicing-scf-e-procurement/chile-extends-dterollout-deadline-for-smes-and-microbusinesses/757135-24 (discussing the phase-in of the law).
198. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697.
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Invoice matching has been used in many VATs for years,199 and
more and more countries have moved over time to digital reporting
of line items and individual transactions. This history both reveals
that information reporting is highly relevant to VAT administration
and reinforces that reliable information flows are essential to
effective tax administration.
III. THE (NON)COMPLIANCE OF FIRMS
Cui’s article not only downplays the importance of TPIR for tax
compliance, it also argues that firms foster tax compliance because
they are “sites of social cooperation under the rule of law.”200 While
Cui does not provide evidence to support this contrarian assertion,
this Article undertakes to examine the available evidence. That
evidence shows not only that firms are not inherently compliant,
but also that firms (like individuals) are responsive to TPIR.
A.

Are Firms Pro-Social, as Cui Argues?

Cui argues that for “most modern business firms . . . complying
with the tax law, like complying with other bodies of laws, is the
default option”201 because “the regulatory state . . . has played a
crucial role in facilitating the division of economic profit within
business firms.”202 Cui asserts:
This dynamic has evolved to a point that firms generally do not
consider non-compliance with tax law as their default option;
after all, the tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the same
governments that have enacted and enforced the other legal rules
that are crucial to the cohesion of firms. 203

199. See supra text accompanying notes 145–49.
200. Cui, supra note 6, at 93; id. at 100.
201. Id. at 134–35 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 143. Cui further argues:
[L]egal rules and norms that developed from the 18th to the 20th century . . .
accompanied the growth of the corporate form: organizational law, antitrust and
securities regulation, and labor and employment law, in addition to the everpresent bodies of contract, property, tort and other private law. Because the
operation of most business firms was inseparable from the implementation and following
of legal orders, the decision to comply with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make.
Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 143.
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This statement seems to suggest that firms reciprocate the helpful
regulation they receive by complying with regulations that impose
costs on firms, but Cui does not cite evidence to support that idea.
For that matter, Cui’s article does not provide any evidence for
his claim of default compliance by firms. Instead, it begins
discussion of the topic by stating, “Consider the postulate that in
modern (i.e., industrial and post-industrial) economies, most
business firms operate, for the most part, in compliance with the
law.”204 If this is true, Cui suggests, “then an important social
scientific question will be why it is true—what has brought about
this state of affairs.”205 Of course, this is not evidence, it is merely
a postulate.
Cui goes on to explain what he means by the notion that “most
modern business firms mostly comply with the law”206:
In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type
of illegal behavior or another, they nonetheless are acting in
compliance with a wide range of other applicable laws. They do
not cheat “wherever they can,” in the sense of exploiting every
opportunity to earn an expected profit by violating the law.207

That statement is surely true, but contrary to Cui’s argument,208
we could substitute “individuals” for “firms” in the foregoing
excerpt from Cui’s article, and the statement would remain just
as accurate.209
Accordingly, Cui’s postulate, even if factually true, does not
show that firms are more honest than individuals. As discussed
below, it is likely the case that it is easier to engage in bad behavior
alone than when the behavior requires others to go along with it.210
However, that says nothing about firms as opposed to individuals
204. Id. at 133.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Cui argues that his account of pro-social behavior applies only to firms: “[I]nstead
of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting motivations for individual taxpayers, the
account suggests that they will be motivated to act this way . . . in the context of the firm.”
Id. at 140.
209. Most individuals comply with a wide range of laws (e.g., they refrain from
committing violent or property crimes), but they may repeatedly break a particular law
and/or occasionally break other laws (e.g., they may consistently drive over the speed limit
or occasionally use illegal drugs).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66; infra text accompanying notes 286–97.
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acting outside of a firm. For that matter, there is good reason to
guess that the subset of firms organized as corporations may be less
compliant than individuals, as corporate existence is inherently tied
to shareholder wealth maximization,211 and as the corporate
form shields individuals from direct consequences for many acts
of misfeasance.212
1. Noncompliant large firms
In his article, Cui narrows his argument that firms default to
being pro-social to focus on large firms.213 Even with that narrowed
211. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[T]he corporate law requires
directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize
profits for the stockholders.”); see also MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING
CORPORATE CRIME: LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT WORK 21 (1998) (“The bureaucratic form of
organization substantially increases efficiency and productivity but it also generates new
opportunities for criminal behavior . . . . Like the Roman god Janus, the business corporation
has two faces: producer of stupefying material wealth on one side, and wreaker of financial,
physical, and environmental havoc on the other.” (citation omitted)).
An important exception to this single-minded duty of loyalty is for “benefit
corporations,” a topic Cui’s article does not discuss. While states’ statutory requirements for
benefit corporations vary, in general, benefit corporations differ from traditional for-profit
corporations in that (1) their articles of incorporation must provide for a public benefit; (2)
their directors are accountable for considering the impact of a potential corporate action on
that benefit objective; (3) the firm must publish an annual benefit report; and (4) shareholders
and others may have standing to hold the firm and its directors/managers accountable to its
public mission. Joseph Karl Grant, When Making Money and Making a Sustainable and Societal
Difference Collide: Will Benefit Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV. 581, 584–88 (2013).
While some benefit corporations undoubtedly do public good, their existence does not show
that corporations are inherently pro-social. In addition, a firm that is focused on maximizing
profits might use the benefit corporation model to “greenwash,” that is, to deceive people
into believing “that it is producing some public benefit.” Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit
Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 525, 528 (2017).
212. Prosecutions of corporate executives are famously rare. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning,
Why Is It Getting Harder to Prosecute Executives for Corporate Misconduct, 41 VT. L. REV. 503, 521
(2017) (“Criminal prosecutions of corporate officers have not happened in the last few years
anyway, and it is getting harder to pursue those cases.”); James B. Stewart, In Corporate
Crimes, Individual Accountability Is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimes-individual-accountability-iselusive.html (“A particularly egregious example is Pfizer, the large pharmaceutical
company, which appears to have been a serial offender despite a string of nonprosecution
agreements and guilty pleas in which it promised to behave better. . . . Despite the
company’s recidivism, none of its senior executives have ever been charged or convicted.”).
213. See Cui, supra note 6, at 102 (“That large firms tend to be more compliant with the
tax law (and other types of law) is an important, but not uncommon, observation.”);
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scope, the argument is difficult to credit, in part because many large
firms have been caught committing organizational fraud or
misconduct. Cui mentions a couple of recent examples214:
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal (installation of a “defeat
device”)215 and Wells Fargo’s cross-selling scandal (the opening of
fake accounts in customers’ names).216 Other widely reported
examples include Enron (accounting);217 Worldcom (accounting);218
Dewey & LeBoeuf (alleged scheme to defraud creditors);219 and
Caterpillar (recently alleged tax fraud),220 among many others.221
As is well known, Enron’s demise alone caused substantial
losses: “Enron was the seventh-most valuable company in the U.S.,
until the revelation of its use of deceptive accounting devices
to shift debt off its books and hide corporate losses led to losses
of more than $100 billion in shareholder equity before it filed

id. at 135–36 (“The important social scientific question is not why, given the default choice of
cheating, most (large) firms don’t cheat on their taxes.”).
214. Id. at 131.
215. See JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL
120–22 (2017).
216. Ethan Wolff-Mann, Every Wells Fargo Consumer Scandal Since 2015: A Timeline,
YAHOO FINANCE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/every-wells-fargoconsumer-scandal-since-2015-timeline-194946222.html.
217. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 72 (2005) (“[S]enior Enron executives set out to manipulate
Enron’s reported financial data to improve the company’s apparent financial success.”); id.
at 84 (“Enron was a failing company propped up by accounting games, deceptive
transactions, and financial statement manipulation.”).
218. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 358 (2003) (referring to “Worldcom, whose less
sophisticated accounting fraud led to a larger restatement of earnings, a larger bankruptcy
filing, and equally far-reaching civil and criminal investigations”).
219. Edward S. Adams, Lessons from Law Firm Bankruptcies and Proposals for Reform, 55
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 507, 528 (2015) (“In March of 2014, New York prosecutors filed a
106-count indictment against [former Dewey & LeBoeuf leaders] Davis, DiCarmine, and
others alleging that [Dewey & LeBoeuf’s] leadership had engaged in a criminal scheme to
defraud creditors.”).
220. See Jesse Drucker, Caterpillar Is Accused in Report to Federal Investigators of Tax Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2mDrRtd (describing a governmentcommissioned report, in which accounting professor Leslie A. Robinson found that
Caterpillar failed to follow U.S. tax and accounting rules and opined that the failures
were deliberate).
221. See, e.g., Accounting Scandals, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Accounting_scandals (listing numerous accounting scandals, including over 50 since the
year 2000); cf. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 9–10 (1980)
(describing an older, highly publicized scandal, the “Love Canal” environmental contamination).
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for bankruptcy.”222 But Enron was far from the only large company
engaging in accounting fraud.223 “The revelation of similar
misconduct by other corporations (including Dynergy, Adelphia
Communications, WorldCom, and Global Crossing) also led to
massive losses.”224
There are many other examples of misconduct by large
corporations, as well, involving many different industries.225
Regarding why that is the case, one study of S&P 500
manufacturing companies226 found evidence supporting its
hypothesis that “high-performing firms may engage in corporate
illegality in order to maintain their performance relative to
unsustainably
high
internal
aspirations
and
external
expectations.”227 That study also found that, unlike less-prominent

222. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1481, 1483–84 (2009). Enron’s behavior led to criminal prosecutions. See Sara Sun
Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American
Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 89, 91 (2004) (“As of July 2004,
thirty-one persons connected to Enron had been indicted, and roughly one third of those
have been convicted.”).
223. Beale, supra note 222, at 1483–84.
224. Id. at 1484.
225. For example, one article includes the following descriptions:
In the health care industry, HealthSouth, the nation’s largest operator
of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers, engaged in an accounting fraud
that inflated earnings and assets by as much as $4.6 billion in order to meet Wall
Street forecasts.
Major European corporations also employed similar deceptive practices.
Parmalat (a dairy-food giant which was the eighth largest industrial group in Italy
and represented .8% of the country’s GDP) collapsed in late 2003 after the
revelation that it had falsified its earning reports for thirteen years, while it was
losing billions of dollars, and claimed assets in a bank account that did
not exist. . . .
Other corporate wrongdoing involved breaches of environmental or health
and safety laws. Three major cruise lines—Carnival, Norwegian, and Royal
Caribbean—pleaded guilty to charges involving the dumping of waste oil, dry
cleaning chemicals, and other toxic substances, and falsifying records to conceal
this conduct.
Beale & Safwat, supra note 222, at 93–94 (footnotes omitted).
226. Yuri Mishina et al., Why “Good” Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations,
High Expectations, and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 701,
706 (2010) (“Our sample consisted of all manufacturing firms that were part of the S&P 500
between 1990 and 1999 and had December 31 fiscal year-ends. The resulting data set
contained 194 firms and 1,749 firm-year observations.”).
227. Id. at 703. One possible explanation they propose for these results is loss aversion
on the part of top managers. Id. at 716.
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firms, “prominent firms became increasingly likely to engage in
corporate illegality the higher investors’ expectations.”228
Moreover, some of the largest modern firms have intentionally
noncompliant aspects to their business model.229 In a recent article
titled Corporate Disobedience, Professor Elizabeth Pollman discusses
examples such as the ride-sharing giant Uber, which “launched
operations in cities around the world—often in violation of existing
laws or, at best, in legal gray areas,”230 and Google, which has
“tested legal boundaries” with such activities as “collecting street
views around the globe.”231 As Professor Pollman observes, some
scholars have gone so far as to suggest that firms should violate
some laws in some circumstances.232
Corporate misconduct is not necessarily a one-off event,
either.233 For example, David Uhlmann reports that the 2010
explosion at Massey Energy’s West Virginia mine (the Upper Big
Branch mine) that killed twenty-nine people was caused by

228. Id. at 716. “[T]he propensity of less prominent firms to engage in illegal actions
remained relatively stable, regardless of their performance relative to investor’s
expectations.” Id. The study “used presence on Fortune’s Most Admired Companies list as an
indication of prominence. . . . creat[ing] a dichotomous variable that took the value 1 if a firm
appeared on the list in a given year and 0 otherwise.” Id. at 708.
229. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 710, 716 (2019)
(“Examining corporate disobedience reveals that there is a wide array of lawbreaking,
ranging from truly repugnant activity that has no redeeming social value to innovative
entrepreneurship that arguably falls into a legal gray area or transgresses laws made in a
different technological or social age.”).
230. Id. at 712.
231. Id. at 736.
232. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to
obey economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the
importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of
how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules . . . [, and] managers not
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).
233. See Marshall B. Clinard, Corporate Crime: Yesterday and Today—A Comparison, in
MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME ix, xix (2005) (stating that
“[r]ecidivism among corporations continues into the 2000s” and including as an example
that “Multinational Monitor . . . has compiled a list of forty-two major law violations of
General Electric between 1990 and 2001” (citation omitted)). In Clinard & Yeager’s study of
582 corporations, they found that “for those firms that had at least one [federal enforcement]
action brought against them [in 1975 or 1976], the average was 4.4 cases.” CLINARD &
YEAGER, supra note 221, at 113. They further state that “200 corporations, or 42 percent of the
total, had multiple charges against them in 1975–1976.” Id. at 116. This study is described
further in infra text accompanying notes 250–55.
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repeated unlawful practices.234 “In January 2008, Massey paid
a then-record $20 million in civil penalties for thousands of
violations of the Clean Water Act committed between January 2000
and December 2006. At the Upper Big Branch mine, Massey
had a methane explosion in 1997, and near misses in 2003
and 2004 . . . .”235
Similarly, “Volkswagen had been accused of deploying defeat
devices as far back as 1973. The company . . . paid $120,000 [then]
to settle with the Environmental Protection Agency. In 2005,
Volkswagen paid a $1.1 million penalty for failing to notify the EPA
of emissions problems in some cars manufactured in Mexico.”236 In
his 2017 book about the Volkswagen emissions scandal, Jack Ewing
reports that, in 2006, when Volkswagen engineers worked on
adapting software Audi used in its diesel engines, they found that
that software already contained a defeat device.237 Volkswagen
persisted in this behavior. For example, Ewing reports that, in 2015,
when Volkswagen recalled cars emitting excess emissions,
“Volkswagen brazenly used the recall to enhance the effectiveness
of the defeat device.”238
Misconduct also is not necessarily confined to one firm within
an industry.239 For example, Ewing states that in deciding whether
to actually deploy a defeat device in Volkswagen engines, some
employees reportedly argued that “all the carmakers cheated.
Volkswagen had to take shortcuts, too, or it wouldn’t be able

234. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1295–96 (2013) (discussing
Massey’s practices of intimidating workers and maintaining dual sets of books to deceive
safety inspectors).
235. Id. at 1296.
236. EWING, supra note 215, at 123.
237. Id. at 120.
238. Id. at 183.
239. See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 8 (referring, among other things, to
“the electrical price-fixing conspiracy of the 1960s that involved 29 electrical equipment
manufacturing companies”); id. at 119 (finding in their study of 582 corporations regarding
federal enforcement actions brought in 1975–1976, that corporations in “[t]he oil,
pharmaceutical, and motor vehicle industries were the most likely to” be the subject of
enforcement lawsuits); Beale & Safwat, supra note 222, at 94–95 (describing misconduct
allegations of major pharmaceutical companies and citing the following amounts reported
in 2003 to 2004 as paid by those companies in response: over $86 million by GlaxoSmithKline,
$271 million by Bayer, $355 million by AstraZeneca, $430 million by Pfizer, and over $622
million by Abbott Laboratories); see also infra text accompanying notes 240–44.
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to compete.”240 Marshall Clinard labeled the oil industry “One of
the Worst,” referring, in part, to violations during the 1990s and
2000s.241 And Professor Sara Sun Beale wrote in 2009:
In the past decade, virtually every major pharmaceutical
company has pled guilty to or settled charges arising out of
serious misconduct. In the previous decade, the 1990s, the most
prominent cases concerned antitrust violations. The largest single
fine imposed was $500 million for a worldwide scheme to fix the
price of vitamins, and fines from the nine most serious antitrust
cases of the decade totaled $1.2 billion. 242

Corporate misconduct was also rampant during the savings
and loan crisis of the 1970s,243 and more recently in the lead-up
to the Great Recession of the late 2000s.244 There are also
older examples:
Historically, we can find evidence of business “crime waves”
in the United States that date back to the early 19th century . . . .
The notion of crime waves is especially supported by patterns of
financial crime. In the 1920s, broad patterns of financial abuses at
major banks joined other patterns of fraud to contribute to the
national stock market crash of 1929.245

Thus, large firms are far from exempt from committing
misconduct. In fact, corporate misconduct may sometimes involve
most of the major players in an industry. One scholar has further
240. EWING, supra note 215, at 122.
241. Clinard, supra note 233. He also referenced his study of violations committed in
1975–76. Id.
242. Beale, supra note 222, at 1484 (footnotes omitted). Clinard labels the
pharmaceutical industry “The Worst.” Clinard, supra note 233.
243. See Savings and Loan Crisis: Federal Response to Fraud in Financial Institutions, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990), https://www.gao.
gov/assets/110/103444.pdf (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General,
General Government Programs) (“GAO estimates that losses from thrift failures could be as
much as $500 billion in the next forty years. Though the extent to which fraud contributed to
or caused thrift and bank failures is not known, fraud has played a significant role . . . . U.S.
attorneys . . . are in the process of prosecuting thousands of financial institutions’ officers,
directors, major borrowers, accounting firms, law firms, and others.”).
244. See, e.g., Anton R. Valukas, White-Collar Crime and Economic Recession, 2010 U. CHI.
L. FORUM 1, 5–6; Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/howmortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html.
245. Peter Cleary Yeager, The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime, 15 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 439, 441 (2016) (citation omitted).
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argued that there is a pattern to cycles of white-collar crime, such
that when the economy is strong, there is a push for deregulation
that allows malfeasance to go undetected.246 Once a recession
occurs, “[r]egulators and prosecutors fix their gaze on the business
world and find no shortage of wrongdoing and corruption.
Wrongdoing and corruption are not necessarily the cause
of economic recessions, but typically recessions bring them
to light.”247
2. The prevalence of fraud by firms
The examples in the previous section of misconduct by large
firms involve high-profile cases. Those cases offer limited insight
into the frequency of corporate misconduct. It is difficult to obtain
precise statistics on the incidence of crimes and other misconduct
by firms, in part because much corporate crime is unreported.248 But
available evidence shows that corporate malfeasance is not a rare,
isolated occurrence.249 For example, in a study of 582 large
corporations, Clinard and Yeager found that, in 1975 and 1976, “350
(60.1 percent) had at least one federal action brought against
them”250—administrative, civil, or criminal.251 Not included in their

246. Valukas, supra note 244, at 2 (“In good times, the public turns a blind eye to
questionable practices that develop, but in a recession, a spotlight is shone on people making
money through dubious means.”).
247. Id. at 4.
248. Clinard, supra note 233 (“[C]orporate illegal violations are not reported in central
sources like the Uniform Crime Reports.”); cf. Sally S. Simpson et al., Measuring Corporate
Crime, in UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CRIMINALITY 115, 122 (Michael B. Blankenship ed.,
1993) (stating that in many of the sources of data they cite, such as court records and
corporate self-reports to regulatory agencies, “[a]s officially generated statistics, only a
portion of the incidence of corporate crime is captured within them”).
249. See Brickey, supra note 218, at 358 (“In the beginning, it was widely assumed that
the Enron scandal was an anomaly. But it soon became clear that this was anything but an
isolated case of financial accounting fraud at a major corporation . . . . Federal and state
regulators have since initiated fraud investigations involving dozens of corporations,
including Adelphia, HealthSouth, McKesson, Tyco, and Qwest. To date [in 2003], some
ninety corporate owners, executives, and employees have been criminally charged, and the
investigations are ongoing.”).
250. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 113.
251. Id. at 110. This study is decades old but has the advantage of being detailed.
Clinard wrote in 2005 that “[i]t is impossible to state whether corporate crime is greater in
the 2000s than in the 1970s. Since then no studies comparable to Corporate Crime have been
made.” Clinard, supra note 233.
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study were undetected violations;252 misconduct that was detected
by federal agencies but not pursued;253 “data on certain types of
agency cases, such as most cases involving taxes;”254 and “detected
violations responded to informally, for example, by telephone.”255
The authors caution that “[w]hat is represented here, then, are only
minimal figures of government actions against major corporations:
the undercount may be as high as one-fourth to one-third.”256
More recently, former Attorney General Eric Holder stated in
2014, “the Justice Department has brought over 60 cases against
financial institutions since 2009, resulting in recoveries totaling
over $85 billion.”257 And this is despite the fact that banking fraud
often is difficult to detect.258 Looking beyond financial institutions,
between 2004 and 2014, the Justice Department initiated 3,270
corporate prosecutions, for an average of 297 prosecutions per year,
though the number trended downward over that period.259
Although these numbers are not large in the context of the total
number of corporations, they reflect only U.S. federal crimes,
and only actual prosecutions, so they reflect only a subset of
corporate crimes.260
Crimes for which firms are prosecuted may actually reflect only
a small percentage of corporate crimes, as such wrongdoing may

252. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 112 n.8.
253. Id. at 111.
254. Id. at 112.
255. Id.
256. Id. (emphasis removed).
257. Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law
(Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarksfinancial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law.
258. Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wellsfargopoints-to-the-failure-of-regulation (reporting, after talking with an expert, that “it is
incredibly easy for banks to conceal their bad behavior”).
259. See Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of
Corporations, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/.
260. Not only do these statistics not reflect state and foreign prosecutions, they do not
reflect undetected crimes and crimes that are not prosecuted. “Over the past 10 years,
occupational fraud referrals to prosecution declined 16%” and the “top reason for nonreferrals was fear of bad publicity.” ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE
NATIONS: 2018 GLOBAL STUDY ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 5 (2018),
https://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2018/RTTNGovernment-Edition.pdf.
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often be undetected or go unprosecuted.261 In his book containing
in-depth case studies and analysis of corporate fraud, John O’Gara
concludes, “[m]ajor management fraud262 . . . is significantly
underdetected. Moreover, when this type of fraud is recognized, it
is all too frequently not prosecuted. The risk/reward implications
of underdetection and underprosecution are obvious.”263
Thus, corporate crime and other misconduct is hardly rare or
isolated, even among large firms. There are numerous examples of
industry-wide corporate misconduct.264 Corporate wrongdoing is
also quite costly.265 As one example, in the 2008 financial crisis,
“corporate misconduct and malfeasance destabilized the stock
market and led to the loss of billions in shareholder equity and the
loss of tens (or perhaps even hundreds) of thousands of jobs.”266
More generally, “many believe [corporate crime] dwarfs the total
annual loss from street crime.”267
3. Tax noncompliance by firms
Having a business infrastructure that includes professional
bookkeeping should facilitate tax compliance.268 It is possible that
some firms committing non-tax malfeasance are fully compliant
261. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 211, at 27 (describing the special difficulties in
identifying and prosecuting corporate crime).
262. “Management fraud (financial statement fraud)” is fraud on behalf of a firm. W.
STEVE ALBRECHT ET AL., FRAUD EXAMINATION 9–10 (4th ed. 2011). Corporate and
occupational crime may be thought of as on a continuum because some crimes benefit only
the corporation, some only the worker, and some benefit both. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note
211, at 22.
263. JOHN D. O’GARA, CORPORATE FRAUD: CASE STUDIES IN DETECTION AND
PREVENTION 149 (2004); infra Section III.A.2. O’Gara’s view that significant management
fraud often is undetected stems from “deductive reasoning, a considerable amount of
experience, and a dash of intuition.” O’GARA, supra.
264. See Beale, supra note 222, at 1483; supra notes 239–45 and accompanying text.
265. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2018 Report to the Nations examined
occupational fraud. It found that “financial statement fraud schemes are the least common
and most costly” at 10% of fraud cases but with a median loss of $800,000. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED
FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 260, at 4.
266. Beale, supra note 222, at 1483.
267. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 211, at 22 (citations omitted); see also Clinard, supra
note 233, at xii (“The cost of corporate crime far exceeds the total for all the thefts, burglaries,
arsons, and robberies put together.”).
268. Cf. Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 283, 309 (2018) (“With an extant bookkeeping infrastructure, the costs of [third-party]
reporting compliance necessarily decrease, making reporting less burdensome.”).
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with their tax obligations—though tax violations may also result
from some non-tax malfeasance.269 Regardless, firms are certainly
not immune from tax violations. It is difficult to find statistics on
the actual frequency of tax evasion, given its inherently secret
nature. However, a study of corporations using IRS Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program data for the 1980 tax year270
“reveal[ed] pervasive noncompliance—two-thirds of the sample
corporations [we]re noncompliant—that involve[d] a substantial
share of profits.”271 The problem is not limited to the United States.
For example, a recent tax compliance paper found that, in
Ecuador, “there is widespread misreporting in the universe of
incorporated firms.”272
More generally, it is well known that small businesses present
a tax compliance problem worldwide.273 Large firms also can be
269. See Grant Richardson et al., Corporate Profiling of Tax-Malfeasance: A Theoretical and
Empirical Assessment of Tax-Audited Australia Firms, 12 EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 359, 366
(discussing an Australian case study that “suggests that even if the primary incentive by a
firm is a [corporate malfeasance] other than tax malfeasance, tax malfeasance and/or
misfeasance is almost inevitable as an element of such behaviors”).
Note that firms that fraudulently inflate their earnings may actually pay more tax than
is actually due to conceal the accounting fraud. See, e.g., Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will
Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent
Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 388, 389 (2004) (finding, across 27 firms, that the “mean firm paid
approximately $11.84 million in taxes on the overstated earnings, an amount equal to 1.3
percent of the market value of the firms”).
270. Eric Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations,
in JOEL SLEMROD, ED., WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125, 153 app. A (1992). The study focused on
medium-sized corporations. Id. at 132.
271. Id. at 126. Approximately 6 percent of the corporations overstated income, but the
median amount of tax overpaid was under $1,000. Id. at 138 tbl.5. Another study, using IRS
data from 1961 to 1987, found that “[t]he empirical results indicate that audits act as an
effective deterrent to corporate noncompliance and that greater audit coverage could lead to
substantial increases in revenues.” Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate Income Tax Compliance: A Time
Series Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 45–46 (1997) (estimating that “the fraction of true
tax liability reported increases by 0.336 of a percentage point when the audit rate increases
by a percentage point”).
272. Carrillo et al., supra note 121, at 145. Third-party reporting is used in Ecuador but
was not being enforced, and the authors found that “[s]elf-reported revenue is lower than
third-party reports in 24 percent of filings, suggesting substantial scope for revenue
collection through enforcement based on third-party information.” Id.
273. See, e.g., Michael Engelschalk & Jan Loeprick, The Taxation of Micro and Small
Businesses in Transition Economies, 2 J. TAX ADMIN. 145 (2016) (discussing efforts at
implementing simplified small business tax regimes in developing countries and the failures
or shortcomings of these regimes); Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding:
A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 113–16 (1990)
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noncompliant with their tax obligations, sometimes leading to
major scandals. These two contexts are discussed, in turn, below.
a. The role of firm size: Why aren’t small firms more tax compliant?
Cui notes that large firms tend to be more compliant than small
ones.274 He does not specify what he means by a “large” or “small”
firm. However, studies generally do find that larger firms—
measured a number of ways (such as by asset value or annual
receipts)—are more tax compliant.275 For example, James Alm and
Chandler McClellan found in a dataset of 8,500 firms from 34
countries that “a one percent increase in revenue increases revenue
reported for tax purposes by 3.77 percentage points, so that larger

(“Self-employed individuals engaged in business, the professions, and agriculture are
sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘hard-to-tax.’”).
274. See Cui, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that “the basic reason that large firms are
more likely to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated whistleblowers is higher
in them (or that they have greater external visibility)”).
275. See, e.g., SANTIAGO LEVY, GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD OUTCOMES: SOCIAL POLICY,
INFORMALITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO 182 figs.7-2 & 7-3 (2008) (showing the
declining percentage of illegal (undeclared) employees by increasing firm size and the
percentage of illegal (unregistered) firms by increasing firm size); Pierre Bachas et al., Size
Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications 17–19
(World Bank Grp. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8363, March 2018) (“[A] 10 percentile
increase in the WBES size-rank is associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of full compliance . . . . [Statistical analysis] suggests that firms depress their
reported size in order to reduce tax compliance.”); Thomas Kenyon, Tax Evasion, Disclosure,
and Participation in Financial Markets: Evidence from Brazilian Firms, 36 WORLD DEV. 2512, 2512
(2008) (“[L]arger Brazilian manufacturing firms declare a greater proportion of their
activities to the tax and labor authorities, but that the difference is small: a doubling of firm
size is associated with an increase of just 4 percentage points in the fraction of sales
reported.”); Todd Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance:
Evidence from Mexico 16 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 19385, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19385.pdf (“A key empirical implication of our model . . .
is that there is less evasion in larger firms.”); id. at 18 (“[I]t appears robust that evasion is
lower in 11–50 employee firms than in 1–10 employee firms (the omitted category), and lower
still in 250+ employee firms.”).
Some studies find the opposite. In a study of 30,000 corporations with assets under $10
million, Eric Rice found that greater “value added” (defined as “taxable income plus salaries,
wages, and officers’ remuneration”) correlated with increased underreporting. Rice, supra
note 270, at 143, 152; see also Noor Sharoja Sapiei et al., Determinants of Tax Compliance
Behaviour of Corporate Taxpayers in Malaysia, 12 EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 383, 403 (2014)
(“Business size . . . is a significant determinant of the under-reporting of income and overall
non-compliance. Medium-sized [publicly listed companies] PLCs with annual sales turnover
of between MYR100 and MYR500 million were observed to be more non-compliant
than small-sized PLCs. To a lesser extent, larger PLCs were more non-compliant than the
smaller PLCs.”).
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firms are more compliant.”276 KKS’s study found that, in Denmark,
estimated tax evasion by firms decreases as the number of
employees increases.277 These studies and several others278 suggest
that larger firm size (measured in various ways) positively
correlates with tax compliance. The evidence that compliance level
varies with firm size suggests that it is not the firm itself that
promotes honesty.
Cui states that “in economists’ use of the term, a ‘firm’ could be
a sole business proprietor. A small firm’s behavior would not be
distinguishable from the behavior of its few individual owners or
employees . . . .”279 However, the studies do not find a cliff effect
dividing individual-like or very small firms from all other firms.
Instead, they generally find progressively increasing tax
compliance with increases in firm size.280
In addition, IRS data suggest that the average small firm’s
voluntary compliance rate is likely much lower than that of the
average individual.281 Recall that the IRS estimates the voluntary
tax compliance rate with respect to income not subject to
information reporting at only 45 percent.282 This figure includes
sole proprietor and farm income and thus reflects at least certain
types of small businesses.283 By contrast, the average individual
receives most of his or her income from wages and salaries.284
276. James Alm & Chandler McClellan, Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm’s
Perspective, 65 KYKLOS 1, 4, 12 (2012).
277. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 225–26 & fig.3 (panel B).
278. See supra note 275.
279. Cui, supra note 6, at 134.
280. See supra note 275; supra text accompanying notes 276–77.
281. In 2001, the IRS’s Small Business and Self-Employed Division, which includes
individuals with business income and partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations with
assets up to $10 million, “acknowledge[d] that the largest part of the tax gap can be
attributed to the taxpayers it serves.” Management Advisory Report: Comparing the Internal
Revenue Service’s Verification of Income for Wage Earners and Business Taxpayers, Ref. No.
2001-30-166 at 4, Sept. 2001 (footnote omitted).
282. See text accompanying supra note 2. The low estimated compliance rate is likely
largely attributable to the lack of information reporting for self-employment income. See
Kleven et al., supra note 1, at 670–71.
283. This category also includes rents and royalties, income from the sale of business
property on Form 4797, and “other income.” TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013,
supra note 2, at 14 fig.3 & n.6.
284. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Wages and Salaries Were 92 Percent of
Income Before Taxes for Consumers Ages 25 to 34 in 2014, TED: THE ECON. DAILY,
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The IRS estimates the voluntary compliance rate with respect to
wage and salary income at a much higher 99 percent.285 The IRS
estimates the overall voluntary tax compliance rate at 83.6 percent,
which is thus something of an average figure286—and still much
higher than the IRS’s estimated 45 percent voluntary compliance
rate on sole proprietor and farm income.
One reason small firms are less compliant may be that they may
more easily engage in cash transactions.287 Entrepreneurs may also
have an above-average taste for risk,288 including for questionable
tax reporting.289 In his book on corporate fraud, John O’Gara
describes a case study that “illustrates what could be called
entrepreneurial risk: Privately held smaller companies, particularly
those operated by more entrepreneurially inclined executives, have
a tendency to play fast and loose.”290
Perhaps most importantly, large firms possess characteristics,
such as increased transparency, that make them easier to regulate291
and reduce the practicability of tax evasion.292 Scholars point to
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/wages-and-salaries-were-92-percent-of-incomebefore-taxes-for-consumers-ages-25-to-34-in-2014.htm (“On average, wages and salaries
were 77.6 percent of U.S. household income before taxes in 2014.”).
285. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 14 fig.3.
286. See id. at 8 fig.1. It is not a true average. The overall rate includes some amounts
not directly attributable to individuals, such as corporate taxes. See id.
287. Cf. Morse et al., supra note 88, at 37 (“Underpayment of tax on business income is
commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”).
288. See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General Equilibrium
Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL. ECON. 719, 720 (1979)
(finding in a model with a risky firm and a riskless wage that “less risk averse individuals
become entrepreneurs, while the more risk averse work as laborers”); Galina Vereshchagina
& Hugo A. Hopenhayn, Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1808, 1810 (2009)
(“[A] number of explanations have been offered to justify why entrepreneurs might be
willing to undertake relatively risky activity: they might be overoptimistic, derive utility
from being their own boss, or be less risk averse than the rest of the population.”).
289. See Lederman, supra note 72, at 1506 (“It is also possible that those inclined to cheat
on their taxes opt disproportionately to start businesses, at least at the margin.”).
290. O’GARA, supra note 263, at 31.
291. See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Benjamin A. Olken, The Missing “Missing Middle”, 28 J.
ECON. PERSP. 89, 107 (2014) (positing that “a confluence of factors make[s] enforcement of
such [tax or regulatory] rules easier in larger firms so that costs from regulation are rising
smoothly in firm size”); see also infra Section III.B.1.
292. Harris and Todaro (1970) was the first to model the dual economy view that
large firms are subject to constraints and regulations that small firms are able to
evade. Their model posits a “modern” sector that pays above-market wages and a
“traditional” sector that pays market wages. Rauch (1991) formally shows how
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such factors as the greater difficulty large firms would face in
keeping transactions off the books;293 the higher likelihood of
audit;294 the increased reputational risk cheating poses;295 and, for
publicly traded firms, the opposing financial accounting
incentives.296 An empirical study using IRS Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program data found that “characteristics that assure
public disclosure of information about a corporation’s operations,”
such as “being publicly traded” or “belonging to a highly regulated
industry,”297 “tend to assure better tax compliance.”298
b. Tax noncompliance by large firms. As in the non-tax context,
noncompliance is not solely the province of small firms. Numerous
large corporations have been investigated regarding abusive
tax-shelter schemes. Examples include Colgate-Palmolive,299
Dun & Bradstreet,300 Dow Chemical,301 Goldman Sachs,302

this mechanism can generate a “missing middle” by assuming a fixed threshold
due to minimum wage laws or labor unions above which firms have to pay abovemarket wages.
Hsieh & Olken, supra note 291, at 107.
293. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 227.
294. See Kumler et al., supra note 275, at 11 (arguing that it may be that “auditors are
more likely to audit larger firms because their operations are more visible, as suggested by
Besley and Persson . . .—a conjecture that appears anecdotally to be relevant in Mexico”
(citing Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation and Development, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUB.
ECON. 66 (2013)).
295. Alm & McClellan, supra note 276, at 12.
296. Alessandro Santoro, Do Small Businesses Respond to a Change in Tax Audit Rules?
Evidence from Italy, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 792, 793 (2017) (citing Michelle Hanlon & Shane
Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127 (2010)). Eric Rice pointed out
several reasons for hypothesizing that publicly traded companies will be more tax compliant.
See Rice, supra note 270, at 138–39. These include SEC disclosure requirements and the
incentives of managers and other stakeholders. Id. at 139.
297. Rice, supra note 270, at 151. The highly regulated industries were banking, real
estate, investment holding, communications, insurance, securities brokerage, and utilities.
Id. at 135 tbl.3.
298. Id. at 151.
299. See IRS and Merrill Lynch Settle on Tax Shelter Dispute, CFO (Aug. 29, 2001),
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2001/08/irs-and-merrill-lynch-settle-on-taxshelter-dispute/.
300. See id.
301. See Robert W. Wood, Dow Chemical’s $1 Billion Tax Shelter Stinks, Says Court, FORBES
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/02/27/dow-chemicals1-billion-tax-shelter-stinks-says-court/#258679937530.
302. See id.

197

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2020

Santander Holdings,303 Hewlett-Packard,304 Kroger,305 and
many others.306
The corporate tax shelter abuses exposed in the early 2000s
provide an example of the breadth of the problem. For example,
the U.S. Senate held hearings on abusive tax shelters in 2003307
and found:
During the period 1998 to 2003, KPMG devoted substantial
resources and maintained an extensive infrastructure to produce
a continuing supply of generic tax products to sell to clients, using
a process which pressured its tax professionals to generate new
ideas, move them quickly through the development process, and
approve, at times, illegal or potentially abusive tax shelters. 308

The hearings further revealed that (1) “[d]uring the period 1998 to
2002, Ernst & Young sold generic tax products to multiple clients
despite evidence that some, such as CDS and COBRA, were
potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters”;309 and (2) “[d]uring the
period 1997 to 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers sold generic tax
products to multiple clients, despite evidence that some, such
as FLIP, CDS, and BOSS, were potentially abusive or illegal
tax shelters.”310
Thus, three of the largest and most prominent accounting firms
in the world were actively engaged for a period of years in the
development and marketing of abusive tax schemes. In addition,
the Senate Report included findings regarding other entities
303. Vidya Kauri, 1st Circ. Reverses Santander’s $234M Foreign Tax Refund Win, LAW360
(Dec. 16, 2016, 9:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/874096.
304. Dave Simpson, HP ‘Equity’ Was Actually Debt and a Tax Shelter: 9th Circ., LAW360
(Nov. 9, 2017, 10:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/983976.
305. Jon Newberry, Kroger Part of Tax Shelter Probe, CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Dec. 2,
2009, 12:06 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2009/11/30/daily27.html.
306. See Ryan J. Wilson, An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants, 84 ACCT.
REV. 969 (2009).
307. TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS,
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 303 (2014).
308. U.S. Senate, The Role of Professional Firms in the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, Report
Prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs (Feb. 8, 2005), at 6, http://www.quatloos.com/
Tax_Shelter_Industry_Firms.pdf.
309. Id. CDS stands for Contingent Deferred Swap. Id. at 10. COBRA stands for
Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives. Id. at 82.
310. Id. at 7. FLIP stands for Foreign Leveraged Investment Program. BOSS stands for
Bond and Option Sales Strategy. Id. at 10.
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involved in these tax shelters, including law firms Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood and Sutherland Asbill & Brennan; banks Deutsche
Bank, HVB Bank, UBS Bank, and First Union National Bank;
and investment advisors Presidio Advisory Services and the
Quellos Group.311
More recently, information leaks have provided a window into
tax malfeasance by large firms.312 For example, some large banks
have helped wealthy individuals commit offshore tax evasion.313
Following the scandal involving the European banks UBS and LGT,
the U.S. Senate conducted hearings and issued a report.314 The
report found in part that
[f]rom at least 2000 to 2007, LGT and UBS employed banking
practices that could facilitate, and have resulted in, tax evasion by
their U.S. clients, including assisting clients to open accounts in
the names of offshore entities; advising clients on complex
offshore structures to hide ownership of assets; using client code
names; and disguising asset transfers into and from accounts. 315

Thus, history shows that large firms, including some that are
household names, may fail to comply with their own tax
obligations and/or assist other taxpayers in noncompliance.
B.

Theorizing Tax and Reporting Compliance by Firms

The previous section established that firms, including
large ones, are not reliably pro-social. Yet, although third-party
reporters typically are firms, Part II of this Article showed that
third-party reporting increases tax compliance in many contexts.
In Cui’s view, the existing literature does not adequately explain
the “puzzle of payor compliance.”316 Why might firms often choose

311. Id. at 7. For example, the Senate found, “Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, and UBS Bank
provided billions of dollars in lending critical to transactions which the banks knew were tax
motivated, involved little or no credit risk, and facilitated potentially abusive or illegal tax
shelters known as FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.” Id. at 111.
312. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 545 (2018).
313. Id. at 545–48 (discussing the actions of banks UBS and LGT).
314. Id. at 547.
315. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON TAX
HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 16 (Comm. Print 2008). The report further found
that “[b]ank secrecy laws and practices are serving as a cloak . . . for misconduct by banks
colluding with clients to evade taxes, dodge creditors, and defy court orders.” Id. at 15.
316. Cui, supra note 6, at 93 (Abstract); id. at 111.
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to accurately report their employees’ wages instead of “regularly
colluding with employees in under-reporting wages, and
bargaining with employees for the benefit of the tax savings from
such underreporting?”317
Cui offers and rules out as an explanation the fact that firms can
deduct wages to reduce business income (and thus tax liability).318
He also notes and rules out the fact that “[p]ayors are also subject
to penalties for failing to withhold or report to the government.”319
However, as discussed below, both of these factors likely do
contribute to payor compliance, along with other internal and
external pressures.320
With respect to the firms’ deduction for wages paid, Cui
correctly observes that no net revenue will ultimately flow to the
government where employer and employee are subject to the same
tax rate, because the tax on the employee’s income would be fully
offset by the tax savings to the employer from deducting those
wages.321 Cui thus argues:
It is when parties are not subject to the same tax rates that the
government can collect net revenue from a transaction, but then,
putting aside transaction costs and the failure to reach and
maintain collusive bargains, the potential will always exist for the

317. Id. at 111. Cui cites an article by Gideon Yaniv for the proposition that “[u]nder a
tax withholding system, an employer and his employees may find it mutually beneficial to
strike a bargain under which the former withholds less than the taxes due . . . while the latter
accepts less than the free market wage rate.” Gideon Yaniv, Collaborated Employee-Employer
Tax Evasion, 47 PUB. FIN. 312, 312 (1992). Yaniv’s paper develops an economic model based
on several assumptions and finds that withholding taxes will actually increase collusion. Id.
at 320. One of Yaniv’s assumptions is that the tax system does not require the employee to
file a tax return (that is, the tax system is a final-withholding system). Id. at 314 n.2. That
assumption does not hold in the United States. “The filing requirement contained in U.S.
law, see I.R.C. § 6012 . . ., has an enforcement advantage in that the employee, in effect, has
an incentive to report on the employer.” Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at
733 n.209. While some employers and employees may still collude, such transparency
provides a deterrent to doing so.
318. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2018) (allowing a business deduction for “a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered”); Cui,
supra note 6, at 112.
319. Cui, supra note 6, at 112 n.89.
320. Both of these factors may reduce a firm’s perceived opportunity for
noncompliance. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
321. Cui, supra note 6, at 113.
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parties to collude and lower the net payment to the
government.322

That is true, but the availability of a deduction for the employer
reduces the employer’s financial benefit from collusion.323
This should reduce the likelihood the employer will take the risk
of cheating.
With respect to payor penalties, Cui argues:
Payors are also subject to penalties for failing to withhold or
report to the government. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUB.
55B, DATABOOK 21 (2016) (Rev. 3-2017) (noting that “[t]he IRS
audited 0.7% of all individual income tax returns filed in CY 2015,
and 1.1% of corporation income tax returns (excluding S
corporation returns)”). However, with low audit rates, the
expected value of such penalties may be very low. While there are
far fewer employers than employees in any economy, the number
of employers is generally still too great for tax authorities
realistically to maintain a high rate of audit coverage. Indeed, the
audit rate for parties required to perform information reporting is
not known to be higher than in other areas of tax administration.
Therefore, a high probability of detection through audits cannot
be what explains payor compliance.324

However, the penalty to which Cui refers is not typical, nor is it
administered like other penalties. Cui’s article does not explain that
willful failure to collect or pay over withheld taxes is subject to a
stiff 100% penalty that is applicable to any person responsible for
collecting or withholding these taxes.325 The 100% penalty is a
322. Id.
323. Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 729. For example, if an
employer pays a nondeductible $100,000 to an employee who has a 25% applicable tax rate,
$25,000 of tax could theoretically be saved if the employer paid the employee off the books.
If the employer instead benefitted from a deduction and had a 21% marginal rate (the
corporate tax rate as of 2020, I.R.C. § 11(b)), reporting the payment would save the employer
$21,000 in tax, while the employee would owe $25,000. That would leave only $4,000 as the
possible gains from collusion (rather than $25,000). In the extreme case in which the
employer and employee’s marginal rates are the same, “the inclusion by the payee is
cancelled by the deduction by the payor.” Cui, supra note 6, at 113. In other words, if the
employer’s tax savings exactly equals the employee’s tax liability (when considering all
applicable taxes), there is no financial incentive to collude.
324. Cui, supra note 6, at 112 n.89.
325. See I.R.C. § 6672(a) (2018). The Code provides a right of contribution for a party
who pays more than his or her share of the penalty. See id. § 6672(d). The 100% penalty is five
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collection tool that is used to try to protect the very significant
dollar amounts326 that are required by statute to be “held to be a
special fund in trust for the United States.”327 Rather than being
imposed by revenue agents within the Examination function
following an audit, the 100% penalty may be imposed by revenue
officers within the Collection function after a business stops paying
over employment taxes.328 This reduces the opportunity to evade
taxes, at least for businesses that have paid employment taxes in
the past.
Thus, each of these structural aspects of the tax system provides
a partial explanation for why more firms do not collude with
their employees. But these are not the only factors that constrain
firms’ opportunity to commit tax fraud, whether in their payor
capacity or otherwise. This section discusses additional external
and internal pressures that may motivate corporate decisionmakers
to comply, focusing first on the external pressures caused by
information flows in large firms and then on other pressures,
particularly internal ones.

times as high as the general 20% penalty that applies to such things as negligence or
substantial understatement of tax. See id. § 6662. However, the IRS “typically uses this
penalty . . . as a last resort to collect taxes that it has been unable to collect from the employer
or other payor,” rather than imposing it as an additional penalty. Mary B. Hevener, More
Carrots, Fewer Sticks: Why Employers Should Be Offered in Payroll Tax and Executive Compensation
Audits All the Protections of Rev. Proc. 64-22, 29 VA. TAX REV. 187, 198–99 (2009). Failure to
provide a required information report is subject to a penalty of $250 for each delinquent or
incorrect information return, up to $3 million per calendar year. I.R.C. § 6721(a) (2018).
326. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., A MORE FOCUSED STRATEGY IS
NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS EGREGIOUS EMPLOYMENT TAX CRIMES 1 (Mar. 21, 2017) (“In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, . . . [e]mployment taxes amounted to almost $2.3 trillion (69 percent)
of the $3.3 trillion collected by the IRS.”).
327. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (2018).
328. See IRM § 8.25.1.4(1) (Dec. 7, 2012) (“The Collection function has sole responsibility
for recommending assertion of the TFRP. Examination function personnel may refer
potential TFRP cases to Collection for investigation.”); see also Keith Fogg, Leaving Money on
the Table and Providing an Incentive Not to Pay—The Story of a Flawed Collection Device, 5
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) (“If a company files a [quarterly employment] tax return and
on that return it lists a liability for which it does not remit payment, the IRS will assess the
liability reported on the return and initiate the collection process. If a company fails to file
a return, the IRS will usually notice that failure within a few months and initiate the
collection process.”).
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1. The information transparency of large firms
Transparency reduces the opportunity for firms to commit
fraud, just as it does for individuals: anyone being watched is much
less likely to cheat.329 In addition, large and publicly traded firms
typically must release significant amounts of information about
their activities, and government regulators can parse this data to
assess corporate regulatory compliance.330 For example, the United
Kingdom has developed a big-data system called CONNECT that
combines data from more than 30 databases for tax enforcement
purposes.331 In the United States, publicly traded firms are subject
to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
are generally required to submit detailed financial performance
reports, including the annual Form 10-K, the quarterly Form 10-Q,
and the periodic Form 8-K.332 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, corporate officers must personally certify the contents of these
reports.333 Other countries also have provisions for data sharing.334
329. See Leandra Lederman, The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion, 106 Iowa L. Rev. __
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 29–30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339558.
330. See Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the
United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
149, 149 (2009) (“Since the 1930s, the United States federal government and the individual
states have shared the responsibility for regulating the governance of public corporations.”);
Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (2013) (“The . . . [SEC]
has long promulgated regulations that say how much and what type of
information corporations must disclose.”); cf. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the
Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 666 (2006) (“Institutions, usually in the
form of corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller in number, have known
locations, and have significant economic incentives to comply with government mandates.”).
331. Paul Rigney, The All Seeing Eye—An HMRC Success Story?, HMRC ADMIN., Nov.–
Dec. 2016, at 8, https://www.ifa.org.uk/media/653935/Tax-HMRC-Connect-system.pdf.
332. See Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answers-form10khtm.html (last updated June 26, 2009). These financial statements
require firms to list certain tax attributes. For instance, firms include a tax footnote to disclose
material differences between book income and taxable income. See Jana S. Raedy et al., Is
There Information in the Tax Footnote? 1 (Dec. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1686036.
333. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012)).
334. The Austrian tax administration has access to “several databases including the
land register . . . [and] the central register for associations,” and “[a]ll authorities of the
federal state, the provinces, the municipalities and the municipality associations and
the other self-administering entities are obliged to provide mutual assistance within the
scope of their competences.” TINA EHRKE-RABEL & CHRISTINA SCHWARZENBACHER,
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This information may increase tax enforcement both directly
and indirectly. For example, the IRS’s Large and Mid-Size Business
division uses the reports required of publicly traded companies in
preparing for audit.335 Professor Susan Morse has argued that
“enforcement efforts wholly unrelated to tax have had a positive
impact on tax compliance because they produce general liability
concerns within organizations . . . .”336 And, in fact, an SEC
investigation may trigger a parallel IRS investigation.337
In addition to this general regulatory transparency, large U.S.
firms have to be fairly transparent to the IRS. First, there are
disclosure rules. It has long been the case that adequate disclosure
may protect a taxpayer taking reporting positions having merely a
“reasonable basis” from accuracy-related penalties.338 In recent
years, however, the IRS has also imposed affirmative disclosure
requirements first on corporations with assets of $100 million or
more and then on corporations with assets of $10 million. If such
corporations set aside a reserve in their financial statements for an
uncertain tax position, they must then file Schedule UTP.339
“Schedule UTP is intended to capture the information that business
taxpayers reported to their financial auditors for the purpose of
establishing reserves for uncertain tax positions under the financial

TAX TRANSPARENCY—NATIONAL REPORT AUSTRIA § 2.2.2.2 (2018), http://www.eatlp.org/
uploads/public/2018/National%20Report_Austria.pdf. Similarly, in Hungary, the tax
agency can access all public records databases free of charge, and generally “is entitled to
receive information on request from the database of any other branches of state and local
administration and state registries.” ISTVÁN SIMON, TAX TRANSPARENCY: NATIONAL
REPORT—HUNGARY § 2.2.2(b) (2018), http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/2018/
National%20Report_Hungary.pdf.
335. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the
Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 89 (2007).
336. Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 964 (2006).
337. Pearson & Mark, supra note 335, at 88 (“Most commonly, SEC investigations have
their counterparts in tax audits by the IRS or investigations by the DOJ. Parallel
investigations are often initiated when one government agency provides information to
another agency.”).
338. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).
339. Cherie J. Hennig & Blaise M. Sonnier, Schedule UTP: IRS Mandates Disclosure of
Uncertain Tax Positions, TAX ADVISER (May 1, 2011), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/
issues/2011/may/hennig-may2011.html.
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reporting process required by [GAAP].”340 The Schedule UTP
requirement may deter firms from taking aggressive tax positions
because they may be reluctant to provide the IRS with an
audit roadmap.341
Second, there are audits. In the U.S. federal income tax system,
many large corporations are under continuous audit. The IRS
assigns large firms to its “Coordinated Industry Case” program
using a system that takes into account such factors as gross assets,
gross receipts, and foreign tax liabilities.342 Empirical studies find
that an increased audit rate corresponds with greater tax
compliance, including for corporations.343

340. Anson H. Asbury, Schedule UTP: The Early Returns Are In, J. ACCT. (Nov. 1, 2012),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2012/nov/20126022.html. Although to
date neither Congress nor the IRS has imposed a specific penalty for firms that fail to file a
required Schedule UTP or that fail to submit an accurate schedule, the ordinary accuracyrelated penalty under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 6662 or the failure-to-file
penalty under Code section 6651 could potentially apply to firms that fail to disclose
transactions reportable on Schedule UTP. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Don’t Be So Certain: IRS
Appears to Be Disappointed in Corporate Schedule UTP Filings, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2012/03/27/dont-be-so-certain-irs-appears-tobe-disappointed-in-corporate-schedule-utp-filings/#2cb90fab1cdb; Robert A. Mathers &
Mark Kmiecik, Tax Practice Responsibilities Involved in Schedule UTP, J. ACCT. (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2015/apr/irs-schedule-utp.html. But cf.
Michael J. Desmond & Ronald L. Buch, Jr., Practical Considerations for Schedule UTP . . . an
Addendum, TAX EXECUTIVE, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 265, 269, https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/docs/archive/utp-addendum_6220pdf.ashx (“In the short term, we expect
penalties will not be an issue, though this could change if the IRS perceives a problem. In
that case, given the hurdles that would have to be overcome in order to impose a failure to
file penalty, it would likely be incumbent on the IRS to pursue targeted penalty legislation.”).
341. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, Lower Tax Reserves Hint at Possible Effects of UTP Reporting,
136 TAX NOTES 1371 (2012) (exploring the possibility that firms have reduced their tax
reserves, despite higher profits, either because Schedule UTP motivated firms to work with
the IRS to address uncertainty or because they simply took less aggressive positions).
342. See IRM § 4.46.2.5 (Mar. 1, 2006).
343. See, e.g., James Alm, Tax Compliance and Administration, in HANDBOOK ON
TAXATION 741, 756 (W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999) (“Nearly all
studies have found that a higher (random) audit rate leads to more compliance . . . . [T]his
impact appears to be small and nonlinear, so that the deterrent effect of a higher audit rate
eventually diminishes.”); Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate Income Tax Compliance: A Time Series
Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 46 (1997) (finding in a study of corporate income tax
compliance using IRS data that “the fraction of true tax liability reported increases by 0.336
of a percentage point when the audit rate increases by a percentage point”).
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Relatedly, many large firms have voluntarily submitted to
examination.344 Under the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP),
the IRS and taxpayer work together to achieve tax compliance by
resolving issues prior to the filing of the tax return. Successful
conclusion of CAP allows the IRS to achieve an acceptable level of
assurance regarding the accuracy of the taxpayer’s filed tax return
and to substantially shorten the length of the post filing
examination.345

The IRS is not alone in its cooperative approach to business-firm
compliance; similar systems are in place in many other countries.346
2. Other pressures
The information flows required or driven by tax and non-tax
regulation, discussed in the previous section, help to explain the
344. The IRS announced in 2011 that it was expanding its prefiling examination
program known as the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP), which it had previously run
as a pilot program. I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-32, IRS Expands and Makes Permanent Its
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) for Large Corporate Taxpayers (Mar. 31, 2011),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-11-032.pdf. The IRS stated that “in FY 2011 there
[were] 140 taxpayers participating. Only taxpayers with assets of $10 million or more [were]
eligible to participate.” Id. In 2012, Professor Leigh Osofsky wrote: “The list of CAP users is
becoming a veritable who’s who of major corporations. Companies such as General Motors,
Pfizer, Wendy’s, Prudential, Estee Lauder, J.C. Penny, and Intel have participated in CAP.”
Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121, 123
(2012). In addition, “[m]any other prominent companies including, in particular, technology
companies, have indicated informally their participation in CAP without formally indicating
their participation in CAP in SEC filings or otherwise.” Id. at 123 n.18.
345. Compliance
Assurance
Process,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/compliance-assurance-process (last updated Feb. 27, 2020). In September 2019,
the IRS announced that it would begin accepting new applications from corporations that
desire to participate in CAP, after having suspended new applications for several years. Id.;
see also IRS Reopens CAP Applications in Expansion of Program, WINSTON & STRAWN (Nov. 20,
2019), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/irs-reopens-cap-applications-inexpansion-of-program.html (“It is expected that the IRS could admit an additional 50 to 100
participants to the CAP program . . . . According to the [Internal Revenue] Service, the CAP
program is still a work in progress and does not have a predetermined number of taxpayers
who will be admitted.”).
346. See OECD, CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE: A FRAMEWORK—FROM ENHANCED
RELATIONSHIP TO CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE 22–24 tbl.2.1 (2013), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/co-operative-compliance-a-framework_9789264200852-en (listing 24
countries, including the United States, that responded to a survey saying “that they have
developed and/or implemented a co-operative compliance model” and providing a
description for each listed country); Osofsky, supra note 344, at 314 n.82 (stating that “[o]ther
countries around the world have also begun to embrace the CAP model,” and mentioning
Australia, the Netherlands, and South Korea).
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relatively high degree of business-firm compliance, at least in
the U.S. tax system. Beyond those regulatory pressures, firms are
subject to additional external and internal pressures that help drive
the firm’s decisionmakers to comply. Some external pressures
vary by type of firm: for example, family firms may face
distinct pressures.347
There are also pressures from within a firm. Any stakeholder
who learns of a collusive strategy could undermine it. It only takes
one employee or self-interested accountant to place a phone call to
the taxing authority,348 and the possibility of whistleblower
compensation, which exists in the federal tax law,349 only increases

347. A 2010 study of a sample of S&P Composite 1500 firms found that family firms—
i.e., those for which “members of the founding family continue to hold positions in top
management, are on the board, or are blockholders of the company”—tend to take less
aggressive tax positions than non-family firms. Shuping Chen et al., Are Family Firms More
Tax Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 42, 44–45 (2010). From a sample of
firm activity between 1996 and 2000, the authors concluded that “family firms exhibit lower
tax aggressiveness than their non-family counterparts, as demonstrated by their higher
effective tax rates and lower book-tax differences.” Id. at 42–43. The authors point out that
the cost of maintaining tax aggressiveness is high for a family firm because (1) outside
investors and minority shareholders may perceive that the family is using their aggressive
position to extract rents and may price-protect and bid the firm’s overall price down, and (2)
family owners who aim to retain their ownership stake for the long term are more likely to
appear on the taxing authority’s radar, sooner or later, than are shareholders who invest in
a non-family firm for a finite period of time. Id. at 44–45. The authors further argue that the
characteristic under-diversification of family firm owners’ investment portfolios and the
desire to maintain the family’s good name in the industry may tip the balance away from
aggressiveness and toward compliance. Id. at 45.
348. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 729 n.196 (“[T]here is always
the risk of defection, both on the part of employees not participating in the collusion, and on
the part of those who participate but, for example, decide that they want more money to
keep their end of the bargain.”); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 91, 123 n.212 (2007) (“The Internal Revenue Service has found that many tax fraud
whistleblowers target ex-spouses.”).
349. See I.R.C. § 7623(b) (2018) (granting authority to the Whistleblower Office to award
whistleblowers 15–30% of the proceeds of any administrative or judicial action brought as
the result of information provided by an individual, and no more than 10% if the information
the individual provided was principally based on publicly available information).
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this risk.350 And “tips are by far the most common initial detection
method” for fraud in general.351
Cui argues that “the basic reason that large firms are more likely
to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated
whistleblowers is higher in them.”352 However, the prospect of
whistleblowing helps deter fraud because it increases the
likelihood of detection.353 Moreover, the larger the firm, the greater
the risk that some participant in the scheme or other insider might
defeat or expose it.354 Thus, the large firms that Cui contemplates as
participants in a cooperative exchange with the government are
particularly unlikely to facilitate tax evasion, not because of their
inherent goodness but because it is extremely difficult to operate a
conspiracy indefinitely on a large scale.355
At a large firm, typically even the tax group is large. “At a
typical public corporation, the tax director has responsibility for
making or recommending tax decisions. . . . Depending on the size
of the corporation, the tax director’s staff can vary from two or three

350. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220 (“Breakdowns can also occur as a result of
rational whistleblowing if the government provides rewards to whistleblowers and firms
cannot make employees commit not to whistleblow ex ante.”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS
55, 61 (2009–10) (“[E]mployees account for 46% of fraud detection where a qui tam bounty is
available, and just 16.3% of fraud detection elsewhere.”).
In some instances, whistleblowers could recover awards from multiple agencies. For
example, a whistleblower who first reports corporate misconduct to another government
agency may submit that same information to the SEC within 120 days, in which case the SEC
will treat the information as though it had been submitted to the SEC in the first instance.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $2.2 Million to Whistleblower Who First
Reported Information to Another Federal Agency Before SEC (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-58.
351. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 260, at 7.
352. Cui, supra note 6, at 138.
353. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 108 (2012)
(“[I]ncreased whistleblowing raises the likelihood of detection, thus reducing the opportunity
to commit fraud.”); see also id. (“Whistleblowing is the single most effective way to
detect fraud.”).
354. Cf. Yaniv, supra note 317, at 314 (finding this in a model of the evasion decision).
355. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1312 (2003)
(“The more conspirators, the more witnesses there are to flip and the more ominous the
prisoners’ dilemma for a conspirator.”); cf. David Robert Grimes, On the Viability of
Conspiratorial Beliefs, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2016) (explaining in the context of alleged scientific
conspiracy theories that “[t]his [collapse] problem appears insurmountable for any large
conspiracy; if it requires constant upkeep . . . then odds of failure approach unity with time”).
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individuals to twenty or more.”356 A 2016 KPMG survey found that
“[o]n average, tax functions of respondent organizations have 16
full-time employees (FTE) at their tax department headquarters
location, and an average of 27 FTEs at other locations.”357
Moreover, the internal tax staff rarely acts alone; rather, it
regularly hires outside advisors, such as law firms and accounting
firms.358 Morse explains that after Sarbanes-Oxley, tax directors
often have to hire different advisors for different purposes.359 The
presence of many people, i.e., “at least four tax or accounting
specialists who bridge . . . the audit firm, the tax planning firm, and
the corporate tax department,” means that “[e]ach group member’s
ability to control information . . . is accordingly more limited.”360
This dispersion of information makes it that much harder to
prevent defections from a collusive agreement.361
Cui argues that “although whistleblower programs operated by
tax and other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent
years, their role in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory
enforcement has been minimal.”362 However, the IRS
whistleblower program has become much more important since
Congress created the IRS Whistleblower Office and enhanced
recoveries under Code section 7623, both of which happened in
2006.363 In its 2019 annual report, the Whistleblower Office found
that the IRS collected approximately $5.7 billion since 2007 thanks
to the whistleblower program, and that it paid out tax
whistleblower awards of approximately $932 million in that time.364
From 2018 through 2019 alone, the IRS collected a total of over
$2 billion thanks to whistleblowers.365
356. Morse, supra note 336, at 964–65 (footnotes omitted).
357. KPMG, A LOOK INSIDE TAX DEPARTMENTS WORLDWIDE AND HOW THEY ARE
EVOLVING 3 (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/
global-tax-benchmarking-survey.pdf.
358. Morse, supra note 336, at 965.
359. Id. at 966.
360. Id. at 967.
361. See supra note 354.
362. Cui, supra note 6, at 130.
363. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432 § 406(a), 120 Stat. 2922,
2958; I.R.C. § 7623(b) (2018); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX
LAW. 357, 361–62 (2008).
364. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
8 (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy19_wo_annual_report_final.pdf.
365. Id. tbl.1.
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In addition, the amounts the IRS has reported collecting as a
result of whistleblower information may be underinclusive. In a
2018 report, the GAO stated:
Prior to February 9, 2018, when Congress enacted a statutory
change requiring the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to include
penalties for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)
violations in calculating whistleblower awards, IRS interpreted
the whistleblower law to exclude these penalties from awards.
However, GAO found that some whistleblowers provided
information about FBAR noncompliance to IRS. In a sample of 132
whistleblower claims closed between January 2012 and July 2017,
GAO found that IRS assessed FBAR penalties in 28 cases. It is
unknown whether the whistleblower’s information led IRS to take
action in all of these cases. These penalties totaled approximately
$10.7 million. Had they been included in whistleblower awards,
total awards could have increased up to $3.2 million.366

The bottom line is that the decision whether to collude with
employees is not a simple matter of one or two people weighing the
tax gains against the statistical probability of being selected for
audit. The decision is far more complex, and the larger the firm, the
higher the likelihood that collusion will be detected or exposed one
way or another.
This insight is important for a question that Cui does not
explicitly raise, as well. As noted in section I.A,367 in criticizing the
effectiveness of TPIR, Cui correctly argues that it does not play an
obvious role in the administration of the corporate income tax.368
Yet the IRS has estimated voluntary compliance with the corporate
tax in recent years at 82 or 83 percent of dollars due.369 If
information reporting is not responsible, what is?
366. GAO, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: IRS NEEDS TO IMPROVE DATA CONTROLS FOR
SOME AWARD DETERMINATIONS intro. (2018).
367. See supra text accompanying note 42.
368. For example, in the United States corporations typically do not receive information
reporting forms from their employees, customers, or suppliers. Cui, supra note 6, at 104.
Perhaps surprisingly, the corporate income tax generally “is not a major source of revenue
in the western world. It provided an average of 8.7 percent of government revenue in the EU
in 1998.” Paul Webley, Tax Compliance by Businesses, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC
CRIME 96–97 (Hans Sjögren & Göran Skogh, eds., 2004). That figure was similar as recently
as 2013, when it was 8.5 percent. See KYLE POMERLEAU & KEVIN ADAMS, SOURCES OF
GOVERNMENT REVENUE IN THE OECD, 2016, at 2 chart 1 (2016). In the United States, the
corporate income tax provided 8.4 percent of federal tax revenues in 2013. Id. at 3 chart 2.
369. See infra notes 372–73 and accompanying text.
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The information transparency discussed in this section
likely explains much of this corporate compliance. Interestingly,
the compliance rate of individuals with respect to income
amounts subject to partial information reporting is estimated at
similar levels: 83 percent of dollars due in the most recent
IRS study, and 81 percent in the previous one.370 In other
words, corporations’ overall tax compliance behavior generally
corresponds to that of individuals with respect to income items that
are partially transparent.
C.

Putting the Contrarian Theory to the Test: What Happens When
Individuals Are the Information Reporters?

In line with his argument that firms are pro-social and
information reporting is relatively unimportant, Cui argues that
imposing an excise tax on a firm would be as effective as instead
collecting that tax from an individual with withholding required by
the firm.371 Note that this argument implies that the addition of an
individual to the two-party relationship of firm/government
would not increase compliance. That is an empirically testable
proposition, and the empirical evidence is to the contrary.
First, IRS data are suggestive. They show that corporations’
voluntary compliance rate with the federal income tax (a two-party
relationship) is eight to ten percentage points lower than the
voluntary compliance rate of individuals subject to substantial
information reporting (a three-party relationship that includes an
individual in addition to a firm and the government).372

370. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
371. See Cui, supra note 6, at 114 (“[T]ax can be effectively collected from wages and
financial income through withholding or, equivalently administratively, payor excise
taxation.”); see also id. (“There has been no study to show that TPIR is more effective than
withholding or excise taxation . . . . This implies that no evidence has been produced that
‘but for’ TPIR, the level of compliance could not be as high as is actually observed.”).
372. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3, at 11 tbl.3, 12 chart
1 (reporting estimated voluntary compliance rates of 83% for corporations and 93% for
individuals subject to substantial information reporting without withholding); TAX GAP
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 13 tbl.3, 14 fig.3 (reporting for 2011–13
estimated voluntary compliance rates of 86% and 95%, respectively); see also id. at 13 tbl.3
(changing estimate 2008–10 corporate tax voluntary compliance rate from 83% to 85% to
reflect a change in methodology).
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That difference is consistent over time across IRS studies.373 This
simple comparison supports the intuitive principle that the
addition of a third-party reporter adds value beyond what the mere
participation of a firm has to offer.374
But those are simply aggregate statistics. If Cui’s hypothesis is
correct, then firms should be equally compliant regardless of
whether they are the subject of TPIR. As it turns out, there are some
instances in which firms are subject to third-party reporting by
individuals. Empirical studies of such contexts have found that
such reporting by individuals results in greater tax compliance
by the firms. This evidence supports our argument that it is
information reporting, not the presence of a firm, that increases
tax compliance.
For instance, Kumler et al. studied a pension reform initiative
in Mexico.375 The reform tied younger workers’ pensions more
closely to reported wages, giving younger workers an incentive to
monitor their employers’ wage reporting, as well as the
information to do so.376 Prior to the reform, workers’ pensions
373. See IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX YEAR 2006 TAX GAP ESTIMATION
3 tbl.2, 4 chart 1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12workppr.pdf (reporting
2006 voluntary compliance rates as 82% for corporations and 92% for individuals subject to
substantial information reporting without withholding); id. at 3 tbl.2 (2001 corporate
voluntary compliance rate was 82%); IRS, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: NET TAX GAP
AND REMITTANCE GAP ESTIMATES (SUPPLEMENT TO PUBLICATION 7285) 2 tbl.1 (1990)
(corporate voluntary compliance rate for 1992 was 81.1 to 88.1%); id. at 2 (“If we have
correctly estimated the extent to which examiners cannot detect all tax deficiencies, then the
‘true’ tax gaps (or VCRs) lie between these two sets of estimates.”); IRS, TAX YEAR 2001
FEDERAL TAX GAP 3 (2006), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf (2001
voluntary compliance rate for individuals subject to substantial information reporting
without withholding was 95.5%); GAO, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE STRATEGIES, BETTER
COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE 6 fig.1 (2005) (1992 voluntary compliance rate for individuals subject to
substantial information reporting without withholding was 95.8%).
374. This accords with the idea that numerosity helps foster tax compliance. That is,
generally speaking, the more people who will know about a fraud and will have to be
induced to refrain from reporting it, the less likely fraud is to occur. See supra text
accompanying notes 64–65; supra text accompanying notes 354–55.
375. Kumler et al., supra note 275, at 4 (“This reform replaced the entire PAYGO
pension system with a system of personal retirement accounts . . . .”). The reform took place
because of concerns that the old pension system was not financially viable. Id.
376. Id. at 9. The authors explain:
Another aspect of the pension reform . . . is that the law requires AFOREs
[Retirement Savings Fund Administrators] to send an account statement to each
holder of a personal retirement account every four months. . . . It appears that
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generally were not affected by the wages employers reported, as
long as the employer reported the minimum permissible wage.377
The result of the reform was that firms reduced underreporting of
wages (and thus payroll tax evasion) for younger workers.378
Similarly, Joana Naritomi studied the Nota Fiscal Paulista
(NFP) program in São Paulo, Brazil, which was designed to
decrease retail firms’ VAT evasion. The NFP provided consumers
with incentives in the form of tax rebates and lottery participation
for requesting receipts, as well as for checking the retailers’ reports
of their transactions online.379 Naritomi estimated that the NFP
increased retailers’ reported revenues by at least 21 percent over
four years.380
Junmin Wan similarly found that a receipt lottery increased tax
payments. He explains that, in China, a 2001 law required retailers
in certain provinces to install a machine that printed an official
receipt with a lottery number.381 The result of the introduction of
the receipt lottery was a 21.5% to 24.2% increase by retailers in sales
tax payments.382 These results were statistically significant.383
A number of other countries likewise have used receipt lotteries
or tax rebates to increase the incentive for consumers to request an

these account statements made it significantly easier for workers to discover how
much employers were contributing on their behalf.
Id.
377. Id. at 2, 6, 7 (“[A]pproximately 80 percent of retirees were receiving the minimum
pension prior to the reform . . . .”).
378. Id. at 20. (“The key finding is that, across the three measures of evasion, we see
little evidence of a differential pre-trend but robust evidence of a relative decrease in evasion
for the younger age groups following the passage of the reform. The wage gap (medians)
measure takes a bit longer than the wage gap (means) measure to show statistically
significant relative decline, but the fact that we see a similar pattern across the three measures
is reassuring.”).
379. Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 3031, 3043–44 (2019).
380. Id. at 3052 (“The results suggest that the NFP program induced a positive and
significant 21% increase in reported revenue by firms across the 4-year period following
implementation. Because I am exploiting differences in the treatment intensity across firms,
the estimated effect is likely a lower bound of the program’s impact.”).
381. Wan, supra note 39, at 613 (“[B]y the end of 2002 there were over 80 big-city-level
local tax bureaus countrywide (out of approximately 662) where the experiment was under
way. In other words, 12% of local tax bureaus [participated].”).
382. Id. at 617.
383. Id. (“For sales tax revenue, the ΔLRE coefficients are significant, ranging from
84.355 to 105.676, and the elasticities of experiment from 0.171 to 0.213.”).
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invoice.384 For example, “[t]he lottery receipt system appeared
and was used by Taiwan in the 1950s to improve tax
collection efficiency; it is still operative. The Republic of Korea also
‘imported’ this system from Taiwan in the 1990s, and the new
revised system seems to work well.”385 The idea is that when
retailers know a transaction is not invisible—because the consumer
requests a receipt and might submit it to the government—retailers
are more likely to comply with their tax reporting and
payment obligations.386
Cui characterizes such lotteries as a “third-party reporting
device that has received frequent favorable comments from
academics in recent years, but is perceived to deliver only very
mixed results in the real world.”387 However, any such “perceived”

384. See, e.g., Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost, supra note 134, at 93–96 (discussing such
a program in Northern Cyprus); Dragoș Mihai Ungureanu & Elena-Doina Dascălu, Tax
Lottery Receipts in Romania, a Different Approach to Fight Against Tax Evasion, 2015 PROCEDIA
ECON. & BUS. ADMIN. 267, 268–72, http://icesba.eu/RePEc/icb/wpaper/ICESBA2015_
33Ungureanu_p267-275.pdf (describing receipt lotteries in Malta, Slovakia, Portugal, and
Romania); Junmin Wan, A Solution to Tax Evasion (Ctr. for Advanced Econ. Study, Working
Paper No. WP-2009-09, 2009) (discussing such a program in Taiwan, which began in 1950).
385. Wan, supra note 39, at 612–13.
386. See Marco Fabbri & Sigrid Hemels, ‘Do You Want a Receipt?’ Combating VAT and
RST Evasion with Lottery Tickets, 41 INTERTAX 430, 435–36 (2013) (Making receipts into lottery
tickets in China reflects “[t]he idea . . . that customers will be incentivized to ask for an
invoice and thus oblige the service provider to pay BT [business tax]. . . . Once the receipt is
issued, the seller cannot evade BT on that transaction. Thus, the buyer has a direct incentive
to ask for the receipt and this indirectly obliges the seller to reveal information to the tax
authorities.”); Wan, supra note 39, at 613 (“LRE [Lottery Receipt Experiment] can work as an
incentive mechanism that can mitigate the information asymmetry between the government
and the taxpayer.”).
387. Cui, supra note 6, at 119–20. In support of this statement, Cui cites two papers for
“critical discussion of real-world experience.” Id. at 120 n.124. They are: (1) a report by the
International Monetary Fund, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT CHALLENGES IN
REVENUE MOBILIZATION: IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 29–30 (2015) [hereinafter IMF],
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf; and (2) a working paper by
Fooken et al., Jonas Fooken et al., Improving VAT Compliance—Random Awards for Tax
Compliance (European Comm’n Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014). Cui
states that the International Monetary Fund’s paper “highlight[s] the limits of lottery
schemes.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.124. That paper states that several countries have used
receipt lotteries and cites Naritomi’s positive finding. IMF, supra, at 30. Its critique relates to
the role of such techniques in the greater enforcement scheme:
There have been very few careful evaluations of these schemes, which should not
be regarded—as some [revenue administrations] appear to have done—as
alternatives to effective auditing. . . . [A] lottery ticket may have much less value
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effect does not accord with the empirical evidence to date. While
some tax lotteries have not yet been systematically evaluated,388 the
evidence from both São Paulo’s and China’s receipt lotteries,
discussed above,389 supports the notion that the addition of a thirdparty information reporter increases firms’ compliance.
That is not to say that receipt lotteries are a perfect tool, or that
they should replace other forms of enforcement.390 And lotteries can
be expensive, although generally some prizes go unclaimed, which
reduces the cost.391 But even if the cost of a receipt lottery in a
particular country exceeds the tax revenue produced, that does not
in itself mean that third-party reporting is ineffective to increase tax
compliance. Rather, it suggests that the total cost of prizes may
need to be reduced if the lottery is to be continued to be used as a
compliance tool in that country.
Thus, the evidence from São Paulo’s and China’s receipt
lotteries suggests that the addition of a third-party information
reporter increases tax compliance by firms. In fact, the studies by
to the consumer than evading VAT on a big ticket purchase. Such schemes clearly
cannot be the centerpiece of an effective compliance strategy.
Id.
Cui quotes the Fooken et al. paper as stating, “While there is growing interest in the
use of tax lotteries throughout Europe, the understanding of best practises [sic] and success
factors is still limited.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.124 (alteration in original) (quoting Fooken
et al., supra, at 3). That observation does not appear critical of real-world experience. The
Fooken et al. paper discusses a one-day workshop in which “European countries who had
already a lottery scheme in place (Malta, Slovakia, Portugal) were invited to present their
experiences . . . together with interested countries, to discuss the specificities.” Fooken et al.,
supra, at 3. According to the paper, the talks and discussion were generally quite positive.
See generally id. In fact, as Cui states, a focus of the workshop was “to bring together countries
with experience and those interested in running tax lotteries.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.127.
388. See IMF, supra note 387, at 30 (“There have been very few careful evaluations of
these schemes . . . .”); Ungureanu & Dascălu, supra note 384, at 269 (“While no major data
analysis takes place in the course of the [Malta receipt] lottery, some figures have been
recorded.”); id. at 272 (“While no evaluation of the lottery scheme [in Portugal] exists, it can
be considered a success and further steps are currently in planning . . . .”).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 379–80; supra text accompanying notes 381–83.
390. See IMF, supra note 387, at 30 (“[T]hese schemes . . . should not be regarded—as
some [revenue administrations] appear to have done—as alternatives to effective auditing.”).
391. Naritomi stated that in São Paulo, as of 2011, only 50 percent of the prizes had been
collected. Naritomi, supra note 379, at 3067. Wan reported that the Beijing tax bureau only
paid out only 16.7% of the available prize money. Wan, supra note 39, at 613. In Puerto Rico,
only 7% of winners of the automatic lottery (which did not require the consumer to register
receipts) claimed their prizes. Marian Diaz, El Fin de Sorteo del IVU Loto, ENDI (Sept. 2, 2015,
12:00 AM), https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/consumo/nota/elfindelsorteodelivuloto2094062/.
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Kumler et al., Naritomi, and Wan all found, in different contexts,
that third-party reporting by individuals improves business firms’
compliance. These studies were not designed to test whether large
firms are more compliant in the presence of TPIR by individuals,
but together they cast significant doubt on Cui’s claim that an excise
tax on a corporation would work just as well as an income tax on
an individual paired with third-party reporting and withholding.392
Instead, these studies support the intuitive notion that having a
third party—someone who is not the taxpayer—report the
transaction to the government improves tax compliance.
Granted, these studies are not exhaustive, and there plainly is
space for additional empirical research. In calling attention to this
gap in the literature, Professor Cui’s article makes a helpful
contribution. But his article fails to introduce evidence
contradicting the studies showing that TPIR is an important tool for
tax administration.
CONCLUSION
While legal and economics scholars generally recognize that the
government needs information about taxpayers’ transactions in
order to enforce tax laws, Professor Wei Cui’s recent article
disputes that understanding. It asserts, counterintuitively, that
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without
information.’”393 Cui’s argument rests on two claims: (1)
information sharing does not “explain the success of modern tax
administration”;394 and (2) the pro-social nature of business firms,
particularly large firms, does explain that success. According to
Professor Cui, what scholars have observed as the success of
information reporting is instead attributable to the inherent
honesty of firms.
This Article has shown that both claims are mistaken. Although
Professor Cui’s assertions are provocative, his article does not
provide evidence to support its contrarian thesis. Instead, the
empirical evidence, discussed above, demonstrates not only that

392. Cui, supra note 6, at 114 (“[T]ax can be effectively collected from wages
and financial income through withholding or, equivalently administratively, payor
excise taxation.”).
393. Id. at 146.
394. Id. at 99.
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information matters in tax enforcement but also that TPIR can be
effective even where individuals, not firms, are the information
reporters. The studies show that inserting an individual into the
transaction as a third-party reporter increases compliance by firms.
Thus, Professor Hemel’s agreement with Cui is misplaced, as well.
Cui and Hemel also are incorrect in stating that VATs do not rely
on third-party reporting of transaction information. On the
contrary, modern VATs have moved to real-time reporting
of transactions precisely because such information-sharing
fosters compliance.
Cui’s argument that firms are inherently inclined to comply
with the law is also mistaken. While an increase in the number of
people who would need to collaborate in fraud does seem to reduce
fraud, there is no evidence that it need be in the context of a firm.
Instead, the evidence suggests that regulation and monitoring
greatly increase firms’ compliance, although they have by no
means succeeded in eliminating malfeasance even on the part of
large firms. In fact, as noted above, IRS data suggest that
corporations are less compliant (by eight to ten percentage points)
with the U.S. federal income tax than are individuals subject
to substantial information reporting without withholding,
underscoring the pro-compliance effect of the presence of a
third party.
Carefully researched contrarian theses can sometimes help
push law and policy in new directions. However, in this case,
the conventional wisdom holds fast: there can be no taxation
without information.
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